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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to document and analyze budget and program reductions
made by the Navy for fiscal years 1990, 1991 and beyond. Current and historical
budget data were obtained from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Comptroller of the Navy and organized to
permit analysis of budget trends employing several models of cutback budgeting.
The thesis examines the following budgetary issues: (1) the trends and impact of
budget cuts on DOD/DON appropriation accounts; (2) projected DOD/DON budget
alternatives for FY 1992 through FY 1997; (3) the effect budget reductions have on
the DOD/DON budget process; (4) the degree of budgetary responsiveness in
DOD/DON cutback budgeting relative to criteria developed from two theoretical
models of fiscal reduction methodology.
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A. RATIONAL FOR RESEARCH
1. Background
Recent public and congressional pressure to reduce the federal budget
deficit and to respond to changes in the international security
environment have led to demands for reduction in the Department of Defense
budget. Political events occurring throughout the world, particularly in
Europe and the Persian Gulf, have raised questions concerning national
security policy and the process used by the nation's leaders to choose the
military force structure needed to carry out these policies. The current
crisis in the Persian Gulf and changes in Eastern Europe, coupled with the
prospect of further arms reductions, have led to calls by members of
Congress for a reassessment of the Pentagon's spending plans. They want to
ensure that the nation is, in the words of one influential defense
lawmaker, "buying the right stuff."[Ref. 1] In conjunction with
the changing threat, is the tide of rising federal budget deficits. Public
clamor to reap the benefits of a "peace dividend", and the perception of
a diminished role for the military in the 1990's, has added impetus to
efforts to reduce future defense budgets.
Concern over the national deficit, which grew as high as 6.5% of the
Gross National Product (figure 1) during the Reagan administration, has
added to the call for reduced defense spending. For FY 1992 the budget
deficit remains a highly visible political issue. The Office of
Management and Budget, in it's July 1990 mid-year review, estimated the
Fiscal 1991 deficit at $166 billion and other estimates range up to $250
billion.
Defense spending, after stabilizing at around half of the total
federal spending in the late 1950's, has fluctuated and is now
approximately 25 percent of the federal budget. Conversely, social
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welfare spending has risen from 25 percent of the federal budget in the
late 1950's to its present portion of about 50 percent of the
budget.(Ref. 2] (Figures 2 & 3) Despite it's diminishing relative size as
an element of the federal budget, defense spending bears greater
congressional scrutiny and intervention than it did in the 1950's.
Why does the defense budget undergo so much scrutiny? In the late
1950's most of the federal budget was approved annually under annual
appropriations acts. Today, some 46 percent, nearly half the budget, is
devoted to entitlements.(Ref. 3] Defense comprises the largest
portion of "discretionary" spending, that portion of the budget which is
approved in the annual appropriations process. In 1990 it comprised
percent of discretionary spending. Therefore, it is easy to understand
that many legislators take a keen interest in the DOD budget. One of
their greatest opportunities to generate pork barrel legislation for their
districts and to gain television exposure is via criticism of the defense
budget.
For example, Representative Leon Panatta has lead the Democratic
majority effort in the House to cut the defense budget. Still, Rep.
Panatta objected to the proposal for DOD to consider closing Fort Ord, to
save money, because it is located in his congressional district.
The above issues indicate the motive for congressional action in the
defense budgetary process. However, this by itself does not explain the
explosion in congressional oversight of DOD. A proliferation of
congressional committees are actively involved in the defense
authorization and appropriation process. In 1990, ten Senate committees
and eleven House committees have formal jurisuiction over some aspect of
defense policy.[Ref. 4] This expansion, coupled with the relative
emasculation of the party leadership structure, has allowed many more
junior members and staffs to play significant roles in the budget process.
Currently, there are nearly 1,500 congressional staffers who deal nearly
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In contrast, during 1964, the four defense subcommittees on Appropriations
and the Armed Services Committees had a total of 37 staff members. In
1989, they numbered 165.[Ref. 6]
Clearly, Congress has both the means and the incentive to intervene
in the DOD budgetary process. This is not in itself bad. Our military is
based on the premise of civilian control. The problem occurs when
Congress intervenes in this process and inserts or deletes programs
without giving consideration to how their decisions affect overall
military program balance and management efficiency. As noted,
congessional intervention is frequently motivated by the quest for votes
to attain local military projects that provide jobs and money for their
constituents.
Concern over the national deficit created measures such as the Granun-
Rudman-Hollings Act (C-RH). The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (the Balanced
Budget and Deficit Reduction Act of 1985, and The Deficit Reaffirmation
Act 1987), was a program designed to reduce the national deficit over a
five year period. It has since been displaced by the 1990 Budget
Enforcement Act, agreed to by Congress and the President, which sets new
deficit targets and redefines deficit calculation.
While former President Reagan and congressional Republicans preferred
tax reductions as a political objective, in the 1980's, they did want
deficit reduction and budget balance if it could be achieved solely by tax
and domestic spending cuts. "The GRH formula o ked like it might make
that possible. The Republicans did not want to cut defense, but that was
happening anyway."[Ref. 71
Conversely, Liberals wanted to pin the deficit tag on
Reagan and not allow him to do that to them. Led by
Speaker of the House, Representative ONeil, they
succeeded in getting the most important entitlement
programs either excluded from or subject to only modest
reductions should sequestration be invoked. The Act, as
passed, exempts 48 Percent of the federal budget
(entitlements and debt interest) from across-the-board
cuts, with an additional 25 percent available only for
very limited reductions. Only 27 percent of the budget,
of which two-thirds is defense spending, would bear
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almost all o f any automatic spending
cuts.[Ref. 8]
By doing this, congressional liberals sought not only to protect social
welfare programs by ensuring that defense bore a disproportionate share of
cuts, but to encourage the President and conservatives to compromise to
avoid GRH sequestration.(Ref. 9] If left intact, The GRH Act
would have had a severe impact on defense.
The deficit is calculated in terms of outlays, while budget authority
may be spent over a period of years. Given a weighted average of
spend-out rates for different types of expenditures, it can take a
lot of authority to achieve a lesser degree of outlay
reduction.(Ref. 10] The across-the-board GRH mechanism for
restraining defense expenditures is irrational and inefficient at
best; at worst, its implementation could actually damage national
security by slicing intolerable amounts from top-priority programs,
rather than preserving them at the expense of low-priority
ones.[Ref. 11]
The unanticipated explosion of the FY 1990 federal deficit from a
projected level of $100 billion to $250 billion left GRH neutered and
ineffectual. In it's place, after five continuing resolutions, the
budget sunmit generated the Budget Enforcement Act that intends to trim
the budget deficit by $500 billion over five years. But, this act may not
prevent a FY 1991 deficit that could peak at a record level of $300
billion excluding the net positive Social Security balance from the
calculation.
a. Changes In the Xnternational Order
Changes affecting U.S. Security are occurring throughout the world,
but most profoundly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (Ref. 12]
General Colin Powell USA
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Late in the 1980's the security balance of the world changed as
Eastern European nations gained their freedom and independence from the
Soviet Union. These changes have caused the United States to reevaluate
national security policy and the force structure and weapons necessary to
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implement these policies. World events have caused the American public to
reduce it's concern about the threat the Soviet Union poses to the United
States. Relaxed concern over the Soviet threat has led directly to recent
tensions over the defense budget. This is illustrated in Secretary of
Defense Cheney's article in Defense 90;
The assumptions allowing this significant reduction in defense
resources and the accompanying reshaping of U.S. forces include a
continuation of the positive developments in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, completion of satisfactory Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreements.
[Ref. 13]
The Intermediate range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty, Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START), and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
agreement, combined with Soviet President Gorbachev's unilateral force
cuts in Europe are significant changes that are altering U.S.-Soviet
bilateral relations.
The INF Treaty signed by President Reagan and then Under Secretary
Gorbachev in December 1987 calls for the removal of all U.S. ground-
launched cruise missiles (GLCM), Pershing Ils and Soviet SS-20s at bases
throughout Western and Eastern Europe. Many Europeans have expressed view
that the INF treaty would lead to the eventual denuclearization of Europe.
"...the Western Europeans are at a disadvantage in conventional forces,
and are worried that they would be forced to seek some form of political
accommodation with the Soviet Union."Ref. 14] Despite such
reservations, NATO allied governments supported the INF treaty. There was
widespread public approval of what was perceived as an arms control
breakthrough and the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on May 27,
1988.(Ref. 15] Thus, the public's perception of a Soviet nuclear
threat and the possibility of conventional warfare in Europe was radically
diminished.
The START and CFE talks also have contributed to the sense of reduced
Soviet threat. The terms of the START talks call for a 50 percent cut in
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the number of strategic offensive warheads in the arsenals of both the
U.S. and the Soviets, while the CFE talks focus on an overall reduction of
Soviet and U.S. conventional forces in Europe. Combined with the INF
treaty, the START and CFE talks have further caused the America and
European public to discount the Soviet threat.
The recent invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces
have caused many U.S. policy makers to force the point for a change in a
"dated" National Security Policy and a relook at the defense budget. This
new reality, the defense lobbyists' hope, may produce more defense dollars
to sustain the military.[Ref. 16]
Early in September 1990 the Pentagon disclosed the costs for operation
Desert Shield. At the October 1990 level of commitment operation Desert
Shield was expected to cost $17.5 billion by the end of FY 1991.
Deployment of an additional 200,000 military personnel, bringing the total
force to about 450,000, will result in the inflation of this total. In
the event of actual conflict, the Desert Shield budget will likely
increase dramatically. Recent figures as high as $37 billion in FY 1991
have been estimated. The 1991 Defense Appropriation Act and budget
agreement for the next two fiscal years stipulate that Desert Shield costs
will be voted by supplemental appropriation separate from the rest of the
defense budget.
Desert shield cost will place additional strain on the budget and put
a hold on distribution of the expected "peace dividend". The events in
the Middle East also have given new hope for many of the Pentagon's pet
programs. "The Middle East crisis may salvage a whole raft of military
weapons that just weeks ago seemed destined for the scrap heap, from
futuristic space weapons to old-fashioned battleships."(Ref. 17)
An example of how the Middle East crisis has breathed life into weapon
systems is the renewed debate over the B-2 Bomber. The House Armed
Services Committee voted early in the year to cancel the production of the
9
$815 million per plane B-2. But because of the Iraqi aggression, stealth
technology has found new support. Congresman Bob Dorman of California,




Includes airlift, sealift and other
deployment cost.
Fuel Cost $2,040
Increased use and cost of fuel
Reserve Callup $3,015




Housing, water, sanitation, etc
Constructive Costs $1,830
Facilities designed for 24 months of use
Other $ 165
Medical, family-seperation pay, misc.
TOTAL $17,530
source: Department of Defense Estimates; Oct. 1991.
representing the district where the B-2 is produced, said "the B-2 would
be an ideal weapon to fly over Iraq".[Ref. 181 Falling into line
behind Congressman Dorman are the Northrop Corporation and the Pentagon.
Northrop points out that in the future leaders such as Kaddafi and Saddam
Hussein will be able to counter-any long range bomber except for stealth
aircraft such as the B-2. To support the need for stealth technology the
Pentagon was quick to deploy the F-117, a stealth attack aircraft, to
Saudi Arabia. Stealth technology has yet to prove itself in combat.
However, this technology has shown impressive staying power on the
budgetary battlefield.
The Iraqi debacle has intensified speculation regarding U.S.
capability to fight mid and low intensity conflict. In recognition of a
diminished strategic threat, supporters of strategic systems view the
10
current international landscape through a prism that finds a conventional
mission for most strategic weapons.
The accelerating cost of military operations to defend Saudia Arabia
from further Iraqi aggression has largely been borne by the United
States. Though significant diplomatic energy has been expended to create
the appearance of political multilaterality, the financial burden of this
conflict has fallen almost entirely on the U.S. and countries in the
region, such as Turkey and Egypt which have endured painful economic
displacement as a result of the war and subsequent the United Nations
embargo of Iraq. Absent from this list of countries are the economic
powers of Europe and the Pacific rim, which are the very countries that
benefit most from reestablishment of middle eastern regional political
stability and concomitant stability in the global oil market. The
dichotomy between the bearers of the cost and the recipients of the
benefits has escalated American clamor for increased financial and
military participation by allies.
Congressional members and staff returning from the middle east have
indicated that continued support from Capital Hill for Persian Gulf
operations might be predicated on increased participation from allies,
more dependent than the U.S. on Persian Gulf oil. This view is supported
in a statement ascribed to an unnamed Kuwaiti financier, "The Japanese
want to play golf at your club but they don't want to pay the
dues."(Ref. 19] The administration's lard nosed efforts to
increase allied support have netted some begrudged financial concessions
from Japan and Germany as well as a limited military participation by a
number of countries.
Reduced concern over the Soviet threat and the events of the Middle
East have caused many to question National Security Policy as well as
force structure.
Not only does a significant mismatch exist between the stated
national-security strategy of the United States and the forces needed
to implement that strategy; there is also a significant mismatch
11
between the resources required to bring these two areas closer and
the resources that are likely to be available in the future.
[Ref. 20]
With the evolving events in Europe and the Middle East the key military
strategy question is "What is the threat?". This, in turn, causes some to
challenge the defense force structure and budget. As noted by John D.
Morocco, Senate Armed Services Conmittee chairman Sam Nunn (D. Ga.) has
long called for a review of U.S. military strategy that would enable cuts.
"...if the proposed cuts were going to take into account the reduced
military threat in Europe, as indicated by Cheney, then you have to
ascertain what that threat is."(Ref. 21] Other political leaders
such as Rep. Les Aspin have lined up with Senator Nunn in the call for
reassessment and reduction. If the threat has changed then DOD needs to
take a look at weapon systems and measure when and if we need
them. (Ref. 22] This attitude towards the strategic objectives of the U.S.
military increases pressure to reduce the defense budget.
2. Objectives
This thesis attempts to assess changes in DON budget in 1990 and 1991
and changes in the DON/DOD budgetary process as a result of having to deal
with decreasing resources. Budgetary and program data are evaluated
against several models of cut-back budgeting. This analysis attempts to
improve understanding of the effect of budget reductions on Navy
accounts, programs and the budget process itse
a. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis documents and analyzes budget and program reductions made
by the Navy for fiscal years 1990, 1991 and beyond. The research examines
budget and program data, performs statistical analysis, and evaluates
alternatives. Current Navy budget and program reductions in force
structure, manpower, and all appropriation accounts are analyzed to asses
their impact on the operating Navy. The following questions are
addressed:
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1. What resource reductions has the Navy made for FY's
1990, 1991 and beyond in response to Secretary of
Defense, Presidential, and congressional budget
decisions?
2. What are the initial impacts of reductions in budget and
programmatic resources?
3. What process had been employed by the Navy to make budget
reductions?
4. Has the Navy's budget process changed in an environment
of reduced resources compared to the process employed in the
growth period of the 1980's? If the process has changed, how is
it different?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This analysis is applied to all DON budgetary accounts. The
methodology required information collection from the DON Office of Budgets
and Reports, the OSD Office of the Comptroller, DOD/DON and other
libraries. Other sources include published academic research in the field
of military budgeting, and interviews with comptrollers of major Navy
conunands and congressional staff.
Interviews were conducted in the Pentagon and elsewhere with
participants in the DOD/DON budgeting to assess changes in the budgeting
process. Sources internal and external to NAVCOMPT were interviewed to
gather data. Interview data is supplemented by internal DOD/DON documents
and articles from professional journals and periodicals.
A review of current theoretical research on budgeting in a cut-back
environment also was preformed. The thesis applies theoretical research
performed by L. R. Jones and Robert Behn in Chapter three. The research
developed a model based on the conclusions of Behn's research and the
Jones model of finacial restraint budgeting. The models are applied in
analysis of the Navy budget cutback process. Navy budget process data is
compared to the results predicted by the two models. Variances from
predicted results is explained.
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D. THESIS ORGANXZATION
Chapter II presents historical defense budgetary data compiled from
a variety of sources. Included in this chapter are tabular and graphical
presentations of budgetary data and analysis of historical trends in the
defense budgetary process.
Analysis of the data arrayed in Chapter II is provided in Chapter III.
The results of analysis are displayed and explanations of the findings are
provided. Chapter III also describes the Jones and Behn budget reduction
models. Analysis is conducted to determine how well the models predict
DON cutback budget activity.
Conclusions drawn from analysis of the data are presented in Chapter
IV. Areas warranting further study also are addressed in the conclusions.
14
11. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT DEFENSE BUDGET DATA
A. BUDGET DATA
1. Background
The following section provides historical background data on the
budget processes and budget environment within which the Departments of
Defense and Navy have operated from 1961 through the present.
a. McNamara and PPBS
In 1963 the Planning/Programing and Budgeting System (PPBS) was
developed under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert Mcnamara.
PPBS was designed to create a systematic process in which resource
allocation supported the missions and plans of the Department of Defense.
Prior to PPBS, the defense budget had questionable continuity from year to
year. Whenever public opinion changed or the objectives of the military
altered, so did the construction of the budget. In the simplest of terms,
PPBS is designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in making choices
about the allocation of resources among the services and defense agencies
as well as among possible programs and alternatives to accomplish specific
national security objectives.(Ref. 23]
The revolutionary change that the PPBS brought to the budgetary
process was the concept of prograuming as a bridge between that already
established functions of military planning and budgeting. The programming
phase is the process by which the policy, force and fiscal guidance
provided in the Defense Guidance (DG) is translated into a plan of
effective and achievable programs.
The goal of PPBS is the accomplishment of U.S. national defense
objectives through the selection of the most effective allocation of
resources. The distribution of limited funds between numerous programs
15
was the leading problem that forced budget development in the Navy during
the Mcnamara era and continues today. Through the use of extensive
planning and priority setting, PPBS would assist budget makers in the
process of determining the size, scope and purpose of the programs
necessary for the construction of effective national defense objectives.
b. Post Vietnam Builddown
In mid-1965, the United States, unwilling to see the whole of Vietnam
and perhaps all of Southeast Asia come under comnunist control, intervened
in force, transforming the character of the struggle.[Ref. 24J
The United States intervention into the Vietnam conflict brought to an end
the defense cutback of American forces, which had occurred since the end
of the Korean War. The defense budget grew as high as 9.6 percent of GNP
(1968).
As the War drew out and confidence in the military's ability to
achieve a quick and easy victory dwindled, the call from the public for
the United States to withdrawal from Vietnam began to grow louder. By the
time of American withdrawal of troops in 1972, the United States military
had grown to a size only second to that of World War II.
During America's military buildup from 1965-1968, the defense budget
averaged 8.5 percent of GNP. As U.S. support of Vietnam leveled off so
did the defense budget. From 1969 to 1972 the defense budget had fallen
to 6.9 percent of GNP, the lowest percentage since 1950. After the war,
the defense budget continued to slide during the Nixon, Ford and Carter
Administrations. By 1980, the last year of the Carter Administration, the
defense budget had fallen to 4.7 percent of GNP.
In his first term (1968-1972), President Richard Nixon approved large
spending increases. Nixon's spending which included huge increases in
social security, loan guarantees, and other pro-spending developments too
numerous to mention were at the expense of the defense budget.
(Ref. 251 Even though America was still committed to the support of the
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Vietnam War, the defense budget decreased cumulatively 2.7 percent of GNP
during the years 1968-1972. By 1972 it was two percent of GNP.
Nixon's term in office also brought with it changes to the budgetary
process. The war that raged over spending generated by Vietnam and new
domestic welfare programs resulted in a series of debilitating battles
over budget priorities.[Ref. 26] Nixon was advocating expansive
spending policies as long as resources were allocated consistent with his
executive objectives. When Congress attempted to challenge his authority
Nixon would impound funds.
Congressional worries that they were losing control over the purse
strings led to the Budget Impoundment & Control Act of 1974. The Budget
Impound & Control Act established requirements for Budget Resolution,
which sets dollar limits for total federal spending, revenue, debt and
national defense spending and linked the economy to the budget. It also
was an attempt by Congress to reassert it's role in the development of the
budget through the control over the president's ability to dictate what
and how funds were to be spent. The Act established Budget Conmuittees to
carry out the requirements set forth within its control. In addition, the
Act created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CBO was to be the
counterpart to the presidents Office of Management and Budgeting (OMB).
CBO was to provide a bastion of neutral analysis, loyal to the institution
of Congress.[Ref. 27]
Defense spending continued to decline ti, ugh the Ford and Carter
administrations. Due to a combination of the end of the war in Vietnam
and continued concentration on welfare policies, defense spending
shriveled by 25 percent (or $58 billion) in real terms between 1970 and
1980.[Ref. 28] The decline in defense spending and subsequent
erosion of military capability, combined with the recession that the
American economy was experiencing, the stage was set for the Reagan




The public's displeasure with the size of government and the
economy were the leading factors that enabled Ronald Reagan to defeat
Jinmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election. As one analyst put it:
The cause of the shift to Reagan was primarily economic. His
greatest strength was among those who believed their economic
position had worsened in the past year, and among those who
considered inflation the primary problem facing the nation...
Economic dissatisfaction is the most direct influence on the 1980
vote and it has a greater impact than any other issue.
[Ref. 29]
With the election of Ronald Reagan came a renewed interest in the
condition of the military, which had suffered under the Carter
administration. Even though Reagan is credited with the military build-up
of the early eighties, it was actually Jiimmy Carter who started the ball
rolling with his last presidential budget.
Defense had declined by half from the late 1950's to the late 1970's
(falling from 10 percent to 5 percent of GNP) but picked up to over
6 percent of GNP as a result of the big push begun by President
Carter in 1980 and accelerated by the Reagan Administration.
[Ref. 30)
Operating from an apparent understanding of the boom or bust
cyclicality of military budgeting, the Reagan administration sought to
build defense aggressively and to sustain the momentum of growth as long
as possible. In seeking to magnify the intensity of the build-up it has
been proposed that the Reagan Administration exaggerated assessments of
Soviet strength, adopted strategies, particularly naval, that were
escalatory and perhaps infeasible, and atte. ted to accelerate the
procurement of new programs that were of doubtful urgency.
[Ref. 31] President Reagan's first five years in office saw the
defense budget grow constantly. Over that five year period defense
spending as a percentage of the Gross National Product grew from 4.7
percent in 1980 to 6.4 percent in 1985. (Figure 3) By 1983, after four
years of substantial increases, the Defense budget had risen by $62
billion. President Reagan's "defense boom" also saw an enormous growth of
the national deficit. The deficit almost tripled from $73.8 billion in
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1985. Growth in the deficit can be attributed to Congress's unwillingness
particularly in election years, to cut social entitlement and the
President's refusal to sanction a tax increase Inevitably, the defense
budget would bear a large part of the burden of deficit reduction. The
large budget deficits that had developed during the Reagan Administration
led Congress to pass the Deficit Reduction Act of 1985. In 1985 Congress
passed legislation to reduce the deficit an additional $63 billion through
this Act. The passage of the FY 1985 budget was slowed by a debate on how
much funding the defense budget should be allocated. The final outcome
resulted in modest 0.2 percent of GNP increase.
President Reagan's first budget was the closest he would ever come to
a balanced budget. He continued to denounce deficits while using them to
discourage spending on domestic programs. His deficits averaged more than
4 percent of GNP, compared to 2 percent in the 1970's.
d. 1986-1990
In 1984 President Reagan was reelected overwhelmingly on a
platform that gloried the status quo.[Ref. 32] A 4.2 percent
reduction of the defense budget was imposed by Congress in 1986, and
another reduction of 2.5 percent in 1987. These changes to the defense
budget came as a result of growing national deficit and a reassessment of
the Soviet military spending practices.
President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1986 budget projected a $180 billion
deficit. This budget met stern criticism by both Democrats and
Republicans who were feeling the pressure from their constituents over the
enormous budget deficit generated by the Reagan Administration. The
result was a budget resolution that contained no real defense increase, a
Social Security cost of living adjustment (COLA) and no tax increases.
The inability of Congress and the President to agree on a way to gain
control over the run away deficit led to the passing into law of the
Granm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
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GR played a significant role in the reversal of defense spending.
The law called for across the board cuts in which defense spending would
absorb one half. This required a search for areas to make significant
spending cuts. If the President refused to support Democratic increases
in domestic spending and wanted continued defense growth he would be
forced to raise taxes, a measure that he was not willing to take. "Reagan
felt that every time he compromised by raising taxes, he did not get in
turn promised cuts in domestic spending."[Ref. 33]
Given Democratic unwillingness to give ground on domestic spending,
the President was forced to either abandon the defense buildup of the
early eighties or increase taxes in order to develop a budget that
Congress would accept and that would prevent the activation of GRH cuts.
"Given the mood created by the events of 1985, the search for significant
spending cuts henceforth had to focus largely on the defense budget, and
the military buildup on the late 1970's and early 1980's began to be
reversed."[Ref. 34]
Another factor in the turn around in defense spending was the
reassessment of the Soviet military and the amount of spending their
government was allocating to its defense. In the early and mid-1980"s, it
was believed that the Soviets were in the midst of a massive military
buildup. This belief fueled the Pentagon's call for larger budgets to
meet the growing Soviet military. However, the Central Intelligence
Agency revised it's estimate of the Soviet military threat in 1983 and
found that the Soviets had actually cut their annual defense growth rate
in half from 4 to 5 percent (from 1970 to 1976) and 2 percent a year from
1976 to 1983.[Ref. 35] This reassessment of Soviet spending
practices coupled with bad press regarding Pentagon mismanagement of
programs such as the Sergeant York and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, caused
the Congress to become more involved in the budget process and intensified
pressures for reductions in the defense budget.
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From 1986 to 1990 the defense budget, in terms of new budget authority
(BA), went into the zero-real-growth mode of operation. In 1988 and 1989
Budget Sumnmit Agreements and Budget Resolutions resulted in reductions
over the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) to DOD and DON toplines of $200
billion and $60 billion respectively.
President Reagan's military build-up was highly investment intensive.
During the Reagan Administration the investment accounts; research,
development, test and evaluation, and military construction were double
that of operation and support expenses. (investment/O&M (Reagan,1981-92)
is .833; percentage change is ((o.833-.53)(100))/(.053)- .57.)
(Ref. 36] Operation and support expenses are spent much more
rapidly that appropriations for investment accounts. The increases in
investment accounts locked the Pentagon into spending streams extending
over several years. This meant the cuts in defense budget were more
likely to come in the form of reductions in the Operations and Maintenance
and other "support" accounts, which would endanger combat effectiveness.
"One risk inherent in this approacb is that the ability of U.S. forces to
deter aggression may weaken if tomorrows big ticket items are foresaked at
the expense of today's combat effectiveness (a function of readiness,
skill, substainability and other factors largely funded under O&S).
(Ref. 37] This debate seems to have set the tone for negotiation of
defense budgets in years to come.
0. 1991-1996
While the threat of deliberate aggression in Europe has diminished,
the dangers elsewhere are increasing. In the coming decade, U.S.
forces must be prepared to cope with other challenges, such as, arms
proliferation anti-American regimes and non-state threats.
[Ref. 38]
In 1989 President Bush's five year plan called for real growth
rates in the military of 1 to 2 percent each year. After the changes of
1989 in Europe and the Soviet Union, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
proposed a 2 percent per annum real decline in defense budget authority
for fiscal 1991 through fiscal 1995. Cheney stated that, *I believe our
21
nation can begin to scale back defense funding somewhat without
unacceptable risk to its security."(Ref. 39]
The budget reductions that Secretary Cheney proposes would mean that
the defense budget would be $515 billion below the zero-real-growth level
for fiscal years 1986-1995. By fiscal year 1995, the result would be a
cumulative 10-year real decline of 22 percent, and DOD outlays as a
percentage of total federal outlays would be the lowest in 50
years.[Ref. 40] Corresponding force reductions accompany these budget
cuts.
One of the priorities that guided the DOD budget request for fiscal
years 1992-1997 was the Maritime Strategy. Adequate naval power is
needed to keep valuable sea lanes of comnunication open in the time of
conflict. America's growing dependence on resources and trade abroad are
the driving factors that require free sea lanes. The budget cuts in the
1990's that are expected will test the Navy's ability to meet this
objective with reduced resources.
The Navy's budgetary plans that conform to the force reductions
proposed by Secretary Cheney include the retirement of two battleships and
planning for the deactivation of one nuclear cruiser in FY 1992 and
another in FY 1994; retirement and deactivation of three SSN 594-class
submarines over and above the three planned for deactivation in the April
budget revision; and deactivation of two 637-class submarines.
[Ref. 41] By the end of FY 1991 the Navy will total 546 ships
which will include 14 deployable carriers.
2. Appropriations
The following data provides the historical and projected dollar size
and trend changes in the DOD/DON budgets from the perspective of
appropriations. The data is segregated to distinguish between investment
and operating accounts. The Constitution of the U.S. of America
specifically states that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but,
in consequence of Appropriations made by law. Appropriation acts provide
22
a specific amount of funds to be used for designated purposes.
Appropriations are divided into budget activities and are further divided
into subactivties, programs, and projected elements of expense.
It is through the appropriation of funds that Congress exercises
control of the national purse strings. Congress uses their control of the
purse strings to ensure that the officers of various agencies are
dependent upon them for funds. Congress also uses this monetary leverage
to ensure that agencies support their political priorities.
Agencies do not share the privileges that Congress enjoys when it
comes to the appropriation of funds. Agencies must justify their meed for
appropriations each year. They must also meet budget submittal deadlines
imposed on them by Congress. Agencies must remain in good favor with
Congress if they wish to receive the funds they desire to carry on
operations.
Congress, on the other hand, doesn't have to justify the amount of
funds they appropriate to various agencies. They also are under budget
deadlines but in recent years it has been the practice to go to continuing
resolutions to ensure that agencies continue to operate.
Congress exercises its financial control through a package of thirteen
appropriation acts. Defense appropriations are categorized by purpose;
Operations and Maintenance, Military Personnel, Procurement, Research and
Development, Military Construction and others and do not directly reflect
military mission areas.
a. Eistorical Tzenda
The amount of funding for Defense is an ever changing variable which
often takes on the face of the political environment in which it is
derived. Over the past twenty years the U.S. defense budget has been on
this feast or famine roller-coaster.
From 1970 to 1975, the time frame when the Vietnam War had come to an
end, the defense budget declined significantly. In 1970 and 1971 DOD
budget authority experienced 10% and 9.7% declines in real growth. These
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were the greatest single year to year declines since the conclusion of
World War II. For the period FY 1970-1975 total DOD budget authority
averaged a 5.8 percent decline. Procurement led all accounts with a
average real growth rate of -8.9 percent, 1971 being the lowest with -16.9
percent real growth. MILPERS averaged a decline of 6.5 percent followed
by O&M with -5.2 percent and RDT&E -4.6 percent.
During the period from 1976 to 1980 defense funding showed a modest
growth rate which averaged approximately 2 percent. However, MILPERS
continued to decline an average of 1.8 percent per year. O&M was the only
account which had an increase during all years of this period and averaged
4.48 percent real growth. Procurement showed a major increase in 1976 and
1977 when it peaked at 19.6 percent real growth. However, it finished the
period with continued decline in real growth.
1981 began the surge towards the budgetary zenith of 1985. From 1981
to 1985 all accounts which make the defense budget enjoyed a period of
unbridled spending. This period saw the DOD budget authority average 9
percent real growth. All accounts within the DOD budget had positive
growth rates. In particular, Procurement and RDT&E reflected significant
increases. Procurement had an average real growth rate of 16.8 percent
while RDT&E averaged 12.8 percent. The MILPERS account which had been in
continual decline prior to this period, increased at an average real
growth rate of 8.38 percent. O&M funding also grew during the period and
averaged 6.94 percent real growth.
As the Cold War came to an end, so did the spending binge of the early
eigthy's. By 1990 DOD budget authority had leveled off and all accounts
began to coaforv to Congress's zero-real-growth program. MILPERS, O&M and
RDT&E all reflected little or no growth while Procurement averaged a -5.7
percent real growth rate.
During this time period, the DON budget, reflected the changes of the
overall DOD budget. However, the DON budget showed more year to year
deviation from the declining trend.
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During the 1970's, the DON budget was reduced significantly, due
largely to the end of Vietnam. In 1970 the DON budget was $71,933 million
compared to $63,037 million in 1980. This equates to a 12.4 percent
decrease in DON's total budget for the period. The trend was a consistent
decline, with the exception of 1974, when the DON budget was $74,237
million. MILPERS had the most consistent trend, declining 3 percent on
the average. (Figure 4).
All of the other DON accounts exhibited various fluctuations. O&M
varied over time but continually grew in total an average of 3 percent per
year and averaged 30 percent of the total DON budget. Procurement
averaged zero-real growth over the ten year period. However, it grew
steadily after Vietnam from 30 percent of the total DON budget to 36
percent in 1980. RDT&E also had zero-real growth over this period and
remained at around 10 percent of the total DON budget.
In the 1980's the DON budget enjoyed unprecedented largesse. The
total DON budget grew from $79,250 million in 1981 to approximately
$100,000 million in 1990. This equates to an average 2 percent per year
real growth rate. MILPERS showed a constant growth rate during the
period, with one exception, from 1987 to 1988 it decreased approximately
one percent only to rebound in 1989 and increase one percent.
O&M peaked in 1985 at $32,939 million, which represented 32 percent
of the total DON budget. O&M, however, averaged a 1.5 percent decrease
for the ten year period.
At 36 percent, procurement accounted for the largest portion of the
DON budget. During this period, funding for Navy procurement increased an
average of two percent per year.
RDT&E continued to represent approximately 10 percent of the DON
budget with annual funding increasing at an average rate of 3.8 percent.
This growth was concentrated in the early 1980's and peaked in 83 with a
single year growth rate of 17 percent. Since 1985 RDT&E funding has
fallen steadily.
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b. Current Budget Data and Projections
The Operating accounts are made up of the Military Personnel and
Operation & Maintenance accounts. The operating accounts represented 58.5
percent of the FY 1991 budget. The Military Personnel accounts finance the
cost of active duty and reserve personnel. The Operations & Maintenance
accounts finance the cost of on-going operations, for example, base
operations, civilian payroll and repair parts. The FY 1991 DOD military
personnel appropriation was $78,080 million which was $973 million less
than the President's request. The congressional decrement was distributed
across the services as follows:
Table 2






*source; Conference report, DOD Appropriations, October 24, 1990.
The reductions came as a result of cuts in active duty personnel
forces. The FY 1991 budget cut an additional 80,000 military personnel
end strength. Reserve and National Guard forces for all services had
modest increases, while the Marine Corps remained unchanged.
Congress appropriated $19 billion for the Active Navy Personnel
account. This is approximately $100 million less than the House
recoimnendation and $22 million more than the Senate recommendation. End
strength reduction was the major element in Navy MILPERS funding cuts,













*source; Conference Report, DOD Appropriations, October 24, 1990
The Marine Corps was appropriated approximately $5.9 million for
Active Duty personnel. This was greater than the House and Senate
recommendations, but was $21,098,000 below the President's Budget request.
End strength reduction comprised almost 90% of these reductions.
Reserve Forces Navy show an increase in appropriated funds for FY
1991. The appropriation of $1,645,000 was $20,400 grater than the
President's request. While the Marine Corps reserve forces remained
virtually unchanged.
Table 4
O&H CUTS FOR ACTIVE FORCE8 ($ hundreds)
PRESIDENT' S
SERVICE REQUEST CourEzRNCE DIFFERENCE
NAVY 24,531,600 23,161,647 - 1,369,953
USHC 1,948,100 1,092,200 - 55,900
USAF 22,048,900 20,060,735 - 1,988,165
USA 23,562,900 21,515,694 - 2,047,206
*souze; Conference Reports, DOD Appropriation, October 24, 1990
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The Operation and Maintenance account for FY 1991 represents 30.9
percent of the total DOD budget. Congress appropriated $83,452,560 which
was approximately $5 billion less than the President's request. The O&M
cuts for active forces were taken by all services.
Like the MILPERS accounts, aggregated O&M funds appropriated for
support of the reserve force was increased. The Marine Corps and Army
National Guard were alone in suffering small funding decrements.
Table 5
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTS, RESERVE ($ hundreds)
PRESIDENT' S
SERVICE REQUEST CONFERENCE DIFFERENCE
NAVY 985,925 998,000 +12,075
USHC 86,100 84,800 -1,300
USAF 1,042,500 1,065,900 +23,400
USA 890,400 909,100 +18,700
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTS GUARD (hundreds)
PRESIDENT' S
SERVICE REQUEST CONFERENCE DIFFERENCE
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 1,988,500 1,980,400 -8,100
AIR NATIONAL GUARD 2,175,400 2,247,200 +71,800
*source; Conference Report, DOD Aprropriations, October 24, 1990
MILITARY PERSONNEL FY 1991 ($ billions)
REQUEST APPN DELTA $ DELTA l
DOD 79.1 78.2 -0.9 -. 01
DON 27.2 26.9 -0.3 -.01
*source; Conference Report, DOD Appropriations, October 24, 1990
Table 6
OPERATION a MAINTENANCE FT 1991 (billions)
REQUEST APPH DELTA $ DELTA %
DOD 88.7 83.6 -5.2 -.06
DOM 24.5 23.2 -1.3 -. 05
*source; Conference Report, DOD Appropriations, October 24,1990
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The Procurement accounts are investment type appropriations.
Procurement accounts within the DON are made up of aircraft procurement
Navy (APN), weapons procurement Navy (WPN), shipbuilding and construction
Navy (SCN), procurement Marine Corps (PMC) and other procurement Navy
(OPN). Procurement accounts represented approximately 24 percent of the
DOD budget for FY 91. Of that amount, DON procurement accounts made up
44.8 percent.
Overall, for FY 1991 procurement account budget authority showed a
real dollar decline of -14.2 percent from FY 90. Actual appropriations
for DOD procurement accounts were approximately 13 percent less than the
President's budget request. The DON procurement accounts also reflected
a decrement to the President's request by approximately 13 percent. The
result of the reductions added up to approximately $4.4 billion for the
DON procurement accounts and $10.4 billion for DOD.
The following is a brief description of how the procurement accounts
within the DON fared in FY 1991 appropriations.
* Aircraft Procurement, Navy: all accounts were reduced with the
following exceptions; AV-8B (V/STOL) Harrier and V-22 Osprey.
* Weapons Procurement, Navy: most accounts were reduced or remained
unchanged except for the AMRAAM and Sidewinder which received no
funding.
* Shipbuilding and Construction, Navy: accounts were reduced. The
Trident, however, received increased funding of approximately $107
million.
" Other Procurement, Navy: all accounts were -educed.
" Procurement, Marine Corps: all account- were reduced and the
commercial passenger vehicles account received no funding.
Table 7
PROCURP.UNT FY 1991 ($ billions)
REQUEST APPN DELTA$ DELTA 4
DOD 77.9 67.5 -10.4 -.13
DON 34.9 29.7 -4.4 -.13
*souzce; Conference Report, DOD Appropriations, October 24, 1990
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Research, Development, Test and Evaluation accounts finance the cost
of scientific research, development, test and evaluation of new and
improved weapons systems and related equipment. RDT&E within the DON is
comprised of funds for both the Navy and Marine Corps. RDT&E was
approximately 14 percent of the total DOD budget. DON accounted for 25
percent of this funding. The resulting reductions to the President's
request for RDT&E funding were 5 percent DOD and 2 percent DON. The
Conference Committee directed DOD to include in its FY 92 budget a
provision that not less than a 10 percent reduction be taken in the
funding of all Federally Funded Research and Development Centers.
(Ref. 421
The DON's RDT&E funding was reduced by $147 million from the
President's modified request. Rear Admiral Milligan, Director of Budgets
and Reports, sites congressional displeasure with previous year budget
execution as the precipitating cause of $87 million of this
amount.(Ref. 43] The rest of the reductions came from the
termination of the Electric Drive program and the P-7 program. Funds were
added for the P-3 modernization program, Sea Lance, SSN-21, SQQ-89 and
industrial preparedness.
Table 8
RDT & Z FY 1991 ($ billions)
REQUEST APPN DELTA $ DELTA 0
DOD 38.0 36.0 -2.0 -.05
DON 9.1 8.9 -.15 -.02
TOTALS T 1991
REQUEST APPN DELTA $ DELTA %
DOD 286.7 268.8 -18.1 -.06
DON 100.3 93.4 -6.9 -.07
*source; Conference Report, DOD Appropriations, October 24, 1990
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3. Programs
a. Size and Force Structuze Trends
The following data illustrates the size trends of total Navy force
structure and components, and considers actual, planned and alternative
program and force reductions. Traditional budgeting is concerned with the
input of resources while program budgeting is concerned with the output of
programs. The program budget sets forth what accomplishments can be
expected from the resources made available. Navy programs are divided into
the following eleven areas:
1. General Purpose Forces
2. Intelligence and Communications
3. Airlift and Sealift
4. Guard and Reserve Forces
5. Research and Development
6. Central Supply and Maintenance
7. Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities
8. Administration and Other Associated Activities
9. Support of Other Nations
10. Strategic Forces
11. Special Operations Forces
General Purpose Forces
General Purpose Forces as reflected in the FY 90 POM represented 56.5
percent of the dollars spent on the eleven programs. General Purpose
Forces have taken significant reductions.
The Navy's POM Data for FY 1991 reflect the following:
0 46 Knox class frigates, 2 Bronstein class frigates, and 7 Iwo Jima
class amphibious assault ships to be decommissioned.
9 By 1997 , 13 attack submarines and 14 auxiliary ships to be
eliminated.
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The Navy's 1992 proposal included:
* Leactivation of two battleships, Iowa and New Jersey, 11 guided
missile destroyers, 8 nuclear attack submarines.[Ref. 44]
" Overall Navy procurement funding in FY1990 was 34.5 million, falling
in 1991 to 34 million. (Ref. 45]
" SLEP(Service Life Extension Program) may be eliminated for two
carriers in 1992, reducing carrier strength from 14 to 12.
(Ref. 46]
* Active carrier air wings will fall from 13 to 12.
Active Navy military personnel is projected to fall from the FY 1989
level of 592,652 to 584,800 in FY 1991. Further reduction to 548,783 is
scheduled by the end FY 1993. Active Marine Corps personnel of 196,956 in
FY 1989 will remain largely unchanged through FY 91, but will fall to
187,000 by the end of FY 1993.
Table 9
Personnel End-Strength
FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
ACTIVE MILPERS (END YEAR) 775,797 781,300 759,976 735,783
NAVY 579,303 584,800 563,276 548,783
MARINE CORPS 196,494 196,500 189,700 187,000
RES PERS (END YEAR) 197,400 192,800 179,742 177,644
NAVY 153,400 149,700 138,842 136,744
MARINE CORPS 44,000 43,100 40,900 40,900
CIVPERS (END YEAR) 348,062 345,504 335,794 333,032
AVY 326,691 324,482 315,086 312,602
MARINE CORPS 21,371 21,023 20,708 20,430
*souzce; Righlights of the DON budget, January 1990
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Intelligence and Coamnuications
The Intelligence and Communications programs provide for the
collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, meteorological nd
oceanographic data. These programs also provide communications support
for Navy activities. The FY 1991 program reflects increased funding for
AUTOVON and AUTODIN and include significant increases related to LEASAT
satellites as well as the addition of three oceanographic ships. No real
growth is included in FY 1992/1993 funding in a budget that reflects
savings of $26 million from management review and revalidation of circuit
requirements. Also incorporated is a total 1992/1993 savings of $28
million due to the change from leased to Navy-owned satellites.
Strategic Sealift
The Strategic Sealift program provides the ability to store and move
supplies and equipment overseas on cargo ships and tankers. O&M funding
for sealift is constant and remains stable through FY93. Sealift
capabilities are enhanced through the procurement of floating and elevated
causeways, utility landing craft, cranes and other container handling
equipment. The conference committee added $900 million to the President's
FY1991 budget request for the procurement of sealift ships for the
prepositioning of Army equipment.
Guard an Reserve Forces
In the face of shrinking active duty forces the importance of reserve
forces has become increasingly evident. This is reflected in Congress's
addition of $1.5 billion for National Guard/Reserve Equipment.
The Navy was appropriated $3,235.9 billion for the support of reserve
forces in FY 1991. This was a $204 million increase over the amount that
was appropriated in FY 1990. In addition to these funds, $85.4 million
was appropriated for the procurement of equipment out of the National
Guard and Reserve Equipment appropriation. In addition to the increased
funds appropriated, the Navy will transfere an additional seven ships to
the Reserve Force.
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Manpower numbers, in both the Navy and Marine Corps reserve, declined
in FY 1991. End strength projections for the Navy fall to 149,700 in FY
1991, from 153,400 in FY 1990. This reflects the effects of additional
ships transferring to the Naval Reserve, and reductions of Full Time
Support work years and Naval Reserve infrastructure. [Ref. 47]
The Marine Corps reserve force decreased by 100 in FY 1991. This was
largely due to reductions associated with the retirement of equipment,
offset by an increase of Full Time Support personnel to accommodate the
stand-up of a Marine Aviation KC-130T Squadron, an increase of one AH-1J
Attack Helicopter Squadron, activation of a Light Anti-Air Missile Battery
and an increase of six Low-Altitude Defense Platoons.(Ref. 48J
Research and Development
These programs include activities related to technology base, advanced
technology development, strategic programs, tactical programs,
intelligence and communications and defense-wide mission support. These
activities finance the cost of new and improved weapon systems and related
equipment for both the Navy and Marine Corps. Funding for R&D has
remained almost constant at around ten percent of the total Navy budget.
However, funding for R&D decreased approximately $411 million between FY
1990 and FY 1991. The tactical programs absorbed the greatest cuts
amounting to $493.5 million. Reflecting congressional concerns, programs
relating to preservation of the technology base as well as intelligence
and conrunications were unscathed and garnered qrginal funding augments.
The Conference Connittee reduced the Prez.-dent's RDT&E request by
$64.7 million. This reduction represents less than a one percent
decrement. By contrast, the absolute value of dollar changes to the
President's request reported out of the House Appropriations Committee was
$1,468.6 million representing a 16% change. Among the specific programs
earmarked for increase include the V-22 (+$238 million), Industrial
Improvement (+$60 million) and Surface ASW System Improvement (+$15
million). Specific programs taking reductions include Electronic Warfare
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improvement (-$100 million) Vertical Launch ASROC (-$15 million) and
Trident II (-$20 million)
Central Supply and Maintenance
Central supply and Maintenance Activities provide supply, maintenance,
technical and other logistic and acquisition management support to the
operating forces. The FY 1991 program request reflected modest increases
in funding to reduce the depot maintenance backlog in aircraft rework.
Additional funding for FY 1991 was requested to support the acquisition of
in-house advisory and assistance services currently performed through
outside contractors. Budget estimates for FY 1992/1993 reflect increases
to support the increasing number of Aegis platforms and increases for
centrally funding environmental protection programs. A modest increase in
FY 1993 is requested for airframe rework to keep the number of aircraft
overdue for maintenance below levels which adversely effect fleet
readiness. The Conference Committee reduced funding for air launched
weapons and other aviation systems maintenance. The Conference Committee
restored funding for central supply conmmand and administration that was
eliminated in the House bill.
Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities
The Training, Medical and other General Personnel Activities programs
provide training and education, health care and other general support to
Naval personnel. Declining Navy end strength has led to a reduction of
$123 million in FY 1991 in these accounts. Tot . medical program funding
remains relatively level from FY 1989 through FY 1991 at $2 billion. The
Conference Committee specifically prohibited the number of medical and
medical support personnel from being reduced below the average number on
duty during FY 1990. The conferees provided an additional $4 million for
the augmentation of the Navy's overseas laboratory programs. This comes
as a result of a recognition of the Navy's contribution to DOD's
infectious disease research and it's potential to improve the ability of
Desert Shield forces to combat the chemical and biological threat.
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Requested increases in training accounts to upgrade service schools
and to develop new "A" and wC" schools were eliminated to reflect
reductions in end strength. FY 1992 funding reflects the shutdown of one
nuclear power training prototype plant and reduction in pilot and NFO
training. Marine Corps training accounts were not reduced in FY 1991.
However, the President's request for Navy training and education was
decremented by $44.7 million.
Administrative and Associated Activities
Administrative and Associated Activities include funding for the staff
offices of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations,
and provide service-wide support in the financial, legal and personnel
areas. The FY 1991 program reflects increases resulting from direct
payment for water and sewage disposal from Naval District Washington to
the District of Columbia, and increased rental payments to GSA.
Support of Other Nations
The Support of Other Nations programs include funding for the Latin
America Cooperative Program, emergency medical travel for certain Navy
personnel, the Technology Transfer program and the Unified Commanders
cooperative programs and exercises with friendly nations. The FY 1991
program request, $7.3 million, reflects additional support for USCINCPAC
cooperative programs with friendly nations and USN hosted conferences
sponsored under the Latin American Cooperative Program. The conference
committee supported full funding of these accounts.
Strategic Forces
The Strategic Forces represent the Navy leg of the nuclear weapons
triad. In addition to procurement of weapons and delivery systems, these
programs include maintenance of the Navy's fleet ballistic missile force
and the maintenance and modernization of their strategic weapons systems.
In addition, resources also support the Trident submarine life cycle
logistic support system and the Trident refit program, base operations
support, and operations of the naval space systems and strategic
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communications. Fiscal year 1992 funding reflects $1.3 million real
dollar growth associated with arms control compliance and verification.
The strategic forces will be augmented by the delivery of one Trident SSBN
bringing the total SSBN force to 41, up from FY 90, but down one from
1989. By FY 1997 an additional Five SSBN's are slated for elimination.
Scial Operating Toces
Special Operating Forces have not been hit by budgetary cuts. In
fact, even in the face of overall DOD budget cuts the Congressional
Conference Committee in acknowledging what it described as a significant
shortfall in funding for Special Operations restored $60 million in SOF
funding previously cut in the House proposed appropriation for FY 91. The
additional funding will bring the account up to $572.7 million. FY 1990
funding has been transferred to the United States Special Operations
Conuand (USCINCSOC) which is assuming management responsibility for the
SOF-unique portion of the program.
4. Appropriations, Programs and the Pillars of Defense
The four pillars, force structure, readiness, sustainibilty and force
modernization, of defense capability are frequently used when discussing
the expenditure of defense dollars. They are used by top level officials
when considering policy issues and resource allocations. Officials
evaluate how policies and programs support the pillars to determine
whether specific programs have the necessary mix of balance and
consistency. All DON dollars are assigned to one of the pillars.
Therefore, every budget decision affects the four pillars regardless of
whether or not they are explicitly considered in arriving at the decision.
There are no universally accepted definitions for these four capabilities.
However, the following definitions incorporate all the primary features
most frequently found in the literature.
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a. Force Structure
The number, size and composition of units that constitute Navy
forces are the elements of the force structure component of the pillar
construct. Budget reductions have already begun to have an affect on Navy
force structure. Battle Force ships have been reduced from FY 1989 level
of 566 ships to 551 in FY 1990 and further reduced to 546 ships in FY
1991.[Ref. 49] These cuts are projected through at least FY 93,
when the total deployable battle force is projected to be 490 ships.
The Marine Corps is budgeted to reflect deactivations of ground combat
elements of eight rifle companies, two artillery battalions, one and half
tank battalions, three truck companies, a reconnaissance company and one
regimental headquarters. Two F/A-18 squadrons, a Hawk Battalion, and a
Marine Wing weapons unit are scheduled for deactivation. Associated
command and service support elements are also eliminated.
b. Readlnca,
Readiness is the ability of existing Navy units, their personnel,
weapon systems and equipment to function as intended and to be able to
deploy and to be employed without unacceptable delays. The Navy measures
readiness with reports that cover whether units are properly trained and
have the personnel, equipment and spare parts required by war plans.
Table 10
AIRCRAFT FLYING HOUR PROGRAM
ACTIVE FORCES F790 FY91 FY92 FY93
PRIMARY MISSION READINESS (%) * 85 87 87 87
FLEET READINESS SQUADRONS (%) 100 100 100 100
FLEET SUPPORT (%) 86 85 85 85
RESERVE FORCES
HOURS PER PILOT PER YEAR 121 121 121 121
i ncludes two percent simulator contribution
*source; Highlights of the DON Budget, January 1990
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Navy Readiness is evaluated through measurements of fleet operational
tempo. The aircraft hour flying program is designed to provide a
specified level of Primary Mission Readiness (PMR). Funding through FY
1991 sustains PMR at 87 percent.
The number of steaming days per quarter directly affects ship
readiness. Within limits, the more time a ship and it's crew spend at
sea, the better prepared it will be to meet the obligations of its
mission. As shown in the table below, incremental decreases in OPTEMPO
have to be taken by deployed active units and reserve units, while the
OPTEMPO of non-deployed active units will increase slightly.
Table 21
SHIPS STEAMING DAYS PZR QUARTER
ACTIVE FORCES NY 1990 NY 1991 TY 1992 FT 1993
DEPLOYED 53.1 50.3 50.5 50.5
ON-DEPLOY D 27.3 29 29 29
RESERVE FORCES 21 21 18 18
*aource; Highlights of the DON Budget, January 1990
On balance, the readiness of forces that have survived budget
reduction has been maintained in the current budget. To improve the
readiness ratings of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve units an additional
$125 million is provided in FY-91 for unspecified equipment.
c. Sustainabillty
Sustainability is the ability of the Navy to continue fighting in
the event of a prolonged conventional war. It usually includes
replacement equipment, ammunition, spare parts, fuel and other material
required to maintain combat strength in the course of a conflict. It is
typically measured in terms of days of supply/ammunition available on
short notice. Over the past years the growth of inapplicable inventories
has drawn attention from the congressional defense oversight conuittees.
Congressional committee members believe these inventories to be useless
and have appropriated a reduction of $400 million in funds appropriated
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for inventories in FY 91. The Conference Committees also agreed to reduce
Title V, the acquisition of War Reserve material, in light of the reduced
concern over the threat in Europe. However, the Committee directs that
the War reserve shall not be reduced any further due to the depletion of
inventories caused by Operation Desert Shield.[Ref. 50]
Sustainability was influenced by congressional action on the following
items.
0 termination of 16 inch gun ammo because of prospective battleship
deactivations.
0 $162 million reduction of spare parts based on the aircraft quantity
reductions.
0 increase of $125 million in funds for unspecified equipment for Navy
and Marine Corps Reserve units.
d. Force Modernization
Force modernization involves the investment in new weapons and
equipment which have technological improvements over systems of previous
generations. Also included under force modernization are the dollars
spent on research, development, test and evaluation. In cutback
budgeting, the modernization program seeks to avoid costly stretchouts,
continue efficient rates of production, and promote the introduction of
newer more survivable weapons. In balancing the need for force
modernization against the need to achieve reduced budget levels, the Navy
seeks the early termination of marginal programs and the termination of
others nearing completion of production runs.
Among the programs proposed for cancellation, the V-22 Osprey was
returned to life by Congress through the appropriation of $233 million in
RDT&E and $165 million for advanced procurement. Modernization of Naval
forces afloat include funding for 14 new ships. Tactical aircraft
modernization continues with the purchases of the F/A-18 and E-2C for the
Navy and the AV-8B for the Marine Corps. THe Navy will also remanufacture
12 older model F-14A and three EA-68 aircraft into the current, more
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capable, configurations.[Ref. 51] The Navy plans to continue the
modernization of the EA-6B at the rate of nine in FY 1992 and 12 per year
beginning in FY 1993 until all have been modified. The Navy has reduced
the planned FY 1992 procurement of F/A-18 from 66 to 54.
Development is continuing on the SSN 21 submarine combat system, the
A-12 Advanced Tactical Aircraft program and the ASW fixed distribution
system. The P-3 ASW aircraft modernization has been funded to replace the
terminated P-7 ASW aircraft. This aircraft was under development as a
replacement for the aging P-3. The P-7 development contract was
terminated for cause as a result of recurring schedule problems and
concerns that the aircraft would be unable to meet performance
requirements.
A number of programs have been terminated or deferred due to
development problems. They includez
" Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ): production funds eliminated
pending demonstration that previously identified short comings have
been overcome.
* T-45 Training Simulator(TS): terminated due to T-45 design
deficiencies.
* Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile(AMRAAM): slowed production
due to continued developmental problems.
In contrast, sealift was the big winner, receiving an additional $1
billion in FY 1991 for the construction of mari -me prepositioning ships.
a. THE NAVY BUDGET PROCESS
The Department of the Navy's budget process operates within the
confines of the overall Department of Defense and Federal budget systems.
The four broad phases of the Navy budget system reflect the embodiment of
the DON process within the larger system. Under PPBS, the budget is based
on the POM. These phases are (1) the internal preparation and submission
of budget estimates from budget submitting activities through the
Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT). (2) Upon SECNAV approval, budget
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estimates are forwarded for DOD/OMB review and approval by SECDEF and the
President. (3) The DON budget, now as a component of the DOD budget is
folded into the President's budget which is submitted to the Congress for
scrutiny, modification and approval. (4) Congress, after due
deliberation, enacts the budget through appropriating legislation which is
followed by OSD apportionment, Navy internal allocation and budget
execution.
1. Overview of the Federal, DOD and Navy Budget Process
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System introduced under
Secretary McNamara, is the process currently employed by the DOD/DON for
allocating resources to achieve national security objectives. In the
broadest sense, this system starts with an assessment of the threat,
develops a strategy to confront the threat and derives an initial
unconstrained set of requirements to implement the strategy. These
requirements are refined into programs which are further winnowed to meet
budget restraints. Over the decades since it's inception, PPBS has
evolved, both as a reflection of the different management styles of
successive Secretaries and as a response to changing world conditions.
a. PlannIng
It is during the planning phase that the threat to national security
is assessed and a strategy to confront the threat is developed. The
culmination of the planning phase is the development of force objectives
and the provision of planning guidance to the services. The sequential
steps of the planning phase functionally mirror Simon's stages of decision
making.[Ref. 52) His three stages, search, design and choice
closely parallel the following three components of the planning phase:
Assess the current situation
environmental review
internal strengths and weaknesses
objectives
Develop alternatives
unconstrained strategy and force alternatives
refinement within feasibility constraints
Select strategy and force levels
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provide guidance to support selected objectives
The planning process is built around two documentary processes, the
Defense Guidance and the Joint Strategic Planning System. The Joint
Strategic Planning System is an iterative fiscally unconstrained process
conducted by the JCS which provides threat assessment, policy guidance,
strategic guidance, and force planning guidance. It represents the
position of the JCS on national security matters and is the JCS input into
the Defense Guidance (DG). The DG, prepared by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, provides the services the guidance needed to prepare
program proposals and budget submissions.
The Navy is unique in that it is composed of two military services.
Planning and programming are delegated to the Navy and Marine Corps and
subsequently consolidated for SECNAV approval. The planning efforts of
the two services are coordinated by the Office of Program Appraisal.
Programming is the method by which the contents of the DG are honed
into a workable slate of financially viable programs. The Program
Objective Memorandum contains information on the programs slated for a six
year period. It includes information about the fiscal year just ended,
the fiscal year currently being executed, the budget year and five
outyears. It is an evolutionary document which builds upon previous
submissions and highlights the current biennial budget.
The six year defense plan (SYDP) is a programming document organized
by appropriation and major program which displays SECDEF's position on
DOD's program. The SYDP contains information regarding the manpower,
dollars, and force structure necessary for the support of major program
areas. The time period under consideration for manpower and dollars range
from the fiscal year just completed through the budget year and out five
years. Force levels are considered for an additional three out years.
The SYDP is updated six times during the biennial budget cycle.
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The resource allocation Display (RAD) is a computer gelerated






* naval warfare task
* line item/activity group
The RAD is updated repeatedly during programming with it's ninth update
being the Navy's POM which is submitted to OSD.
b. Prograaning
The programming cycle starts with a revision of the estimates
contained in the last four years of the previous POM cycle. The POM cycle
does not make a fresh start each biennial period. Revision and update are
an almost continuous process through the duration of the programming
process.
PPBS was modified in 1987 to reflect the introduction of legislatively
enacted biennial budgeting, Congressional failure to appropriate on other
than a single year basis has led to significant programmatic changes in
the off year of he POM.
Each service submits it's POM to OSD for review and approval. The
Defense Resources Board conducts a series of program review meetings
during which issues of concern are raised and evaluated. The DRB is
concerned that total defense balance is achieved through the independently
prepared service POMs. Tentative changes are reviewed for combined impact
on programs and recommended changes are forwarded for SECDEF
consideration.
The POMs also are reviewed by the JCS to assess how well the proposed
programs embody national security strategy and threat concerns. The
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recommendations of the JCS are contained in the Joint Program Assessment
Memorandom (JPAM). DRB recommendations and the JPAM form the basis for
SECDEF evaluation of the PO4s.
SECDEF POM decisions are issued to each service in Program Decision
Memorandums (PDM). The PDM reflects the approved POM and includes
modifications resulting from the SECDEF review.
Navy programming begins with reviews of strategy, warfare areas, and
support tasks.[Ref. 533 These reviews examine the threat,
previous program levels, and the requirements of OSD guidance. After the
completion of review and the input of Claimants, Component Commanders and
Resource Sponsers have been considered, OP-80 develops the Department of
the Navy Consolidated Planning and Programming Guidance (DNCPPG) which
represents SECNAV program priorities. The DNCPPG is used to provide
guidance to resource sponsors in preparing their program proposals. Based
on these reconuendations, CNO guidance, and input from related comumands
the resource sponsors prepare Sponsor Program Proposals. Program
proposals are submitted to OP-80 to be reviewed for compliance with higher
guidance and the resolution of outstanding issues. Upon presentation to
CNO/SECNAV these proposals form the basis for the POM.
c. Budgeting
The budgeting phase of PPBS begins with the approved and modified POM.
The services change their respective SYDP's to reflect DOD generated
program additions and deletions.. From this base, programs are coupled to
annual funding requirements. Budget estimates flow up through the service
hierarchy and are forwarded for joint OSD/OMB review. Through this
review, SECDEF generates Program Budgeting Decisions (PBD) which reflect
potential modifications. The services and JCS enjoy a final review and
offer comments which SECDEF may consider in the preparation of final
service budget proposals. The service budget proposals are combined to
form the DOD submission and in turn takes it's place in the President's
budget which is submitted to Congress.
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2. CoMptroller of the Navy Dudget Process
The Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) is the focal point for DON
budgeting. Responsibilities cross all phases of Navy budgeting from
formulation through execution and review of performance against
projections. The Director of Budgets and Reports is responsible under the
Comptroller for the formulation, presentation and execution of the DON
budget.
The completion of the Navy POM represents the end of the programming
phase of the Navy PPBS process. However, the break between programming
and budgeting is not so clean. As detailed in following sections,
congressional intervention during authorization and appropriation have
resulted in changes to DOD budget line items. The number of line item
changes have ranged as high as 60 percent which occurred in FY 1987.
These changes routinely increase and decrease the size of programs. As an
example, funding was not requested for the V-22 in the DOD FY 1991 budget
request. Subsequent congressional action restored funding for this
program. By the time congressional action is complete, the following
year's POM has already been completed and the budget process for the next
fiscal year is well under way.
It is during budgeting that the approximate resource requirements
developed during programming are refined to the greatest possible
precision and are changed from a program to an appropriation format. The
key word with the budget is "executability".[P 54]
a. Departmnt of the Navy Budget Revew
The DON budget review consists of the preparation of budget
estimates by submitting offices. NAVCOMPT reviews these estimates to
ensure that they support the programs resident in the POM and incorporate
the guidance of higher authority. Budget estimates must also be
executable and supportable during OSD/OMB and congressional review.
The budget estimation process is conducted by the budget submitting
offices responsible for the preparation and submission of budget estimates
47
to NAVCOMPT. These offices control the compilation of estimates from
subordinate commands, are called upon to provide justification and
testimony, and to prepare responses to changes made by higher authority.
The budget estimating system links budget preparation to the organizations
that perform budget execution. This linkage promotes the development of
well reasoned estimates of required resources by involving management at
all levels in the budget process.
The review of estimates is controlled by the NAVCOMPT Budget
Evaluation Group (NCBG). The objectives of this review include ensuring
POM programs are represented and adequately funded, adequate cost control
is used in fulfilling program objectives and that programs are consistent
with the guidance of higher authority. The review also allows the
evaluation of cost effectiveness in considering alternative courses for
accomplishing program objectives. Finally, information or circumstances
that have evolved since the completion of the POM that impact resource
allocation may be incorporated during the review.
Sources in NAVCOMPT indicate that the quality of the budget estimates
received from submitting offices range from excellent to clever to
incompetent. In an environment of diminishing resources the emphasis of
review of these estimates focuses on the need to minimize costs while
providing for priority programs. Upon completion of the review of budget
estimates, a Navcompt "Mark-up" with recommended adjustments and
explanatory comments is prepared. The budget s i'.tting offices have the
opportunity to rebut recommended reductions in a reclama. In the absence
of a reclama, these decisions become final. The receipt of a reclama is
followed by a full review of the issues surrounding the recommended
modification. Issues are generally resolved within NCB. The proposed
budget, highlighting decisions made during NAVCOMPT budget review and any
other outstanding issues, is presented to SECNAV for final decision.
The internal DON phase of budget review is completed with the
submission of budget estimates to OSD/OMB.
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3. Budget Review by the Office of the szcDzr eand the o5
Upon completion of the Navy budget review and SECNAV approval, the
budget estimates are forwarded to the Office of the Secreta y of Defense
and the Office of Management and Budget for their joint review,
consolidation with the budget estimates of the other services, and
incorporation into the President's budget request. This review seeks to
ensure that program and budget guidance have been incorporated in the
budget estimates.
In the face of budget reductions, interservice rivalry, always a
factor in DOD resource allocation, has led to an almost unprecedented
level of cross-service poaching. This can be illustrated by the recent
verbal brawl between Navy and Air Force contingents regarding the ability
of Navy owned, space-based wide area surveillance systems to detect and
track Air Force stealth aircraft.
As the defense budget fight comes to a head, Navy officials make no
secret of the view that naval aviation programs are in direct
competition with the Air Force B-2 bomber. By showing that long-
range stealth aircraft can be detected form space, the sea service
can refute claims that the B-2 can replace carrier strike
aircraft."[Ref. 55]
This poaching has spilled over into the press and has required SECDEF
mediation. This is an indication of increasing pressure by the services
to resist the inevitable cuts.
The preliminary review of service budget estimates is followed by
hearings to assess program details and lead to the formulation of Program
Decision Memoranda (PBDs). PBDs provide the SECDEF with an analysis of
the services program and budget requests, highlights problem areas and
provides alternative recommendations. Prior to forwarding of PBDs for
SECDEF approval, Draft and Advance PBDs are sent back to the services for
their review and response. In the Navy process, NAVCOMPT is responsible
for the preparation of comments regarding issues raised in these
documents. Response time is extremely short, coordination is crucial, and
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often1 information resident in far flung DON activities is required.
NAVCOMPT is responsible for the internal processing of signed PBDs and
coordinates the preparation, review, and submission of reclamas to OSD
Comptroller.
Budget issues that remain outstanding may be resolved at one of three
forums. Most areas of contention documented by reclama are resolved
administratively between NAVCOMPT and the DOD comptroller staff.
Significant issues which remain are addressed at a Major Budget Issues
Meeting. This meeting gives the Navy the opportunity to address issues
raised by the OSD/OMB review. Typically, the CNO and CMC join the SECNAV
in this meeting with SECDEF. Finally, areas of disagreement between DOD
and OMB may be addressed in the SECDEF Meeting with the President. After
each of these reviews, PBDs are issued reflecting the resulting decisions.
These reviews change the budget detail and totals which must be
incorporated in the Navy's budget estimates. In order to ensure
continuity within this iterative process, NAVCOMPT issues all control
numbers. These numbers reflect the decision, constraints and requirements
imposed within and by higher authority, and are the base budget numbers
against which changes at each phase of the budget process are recorded.
a. Congrossional Review
Congressional review of the DOD budget commences with the submission
of the President's budget request for the entire government during early
February. The President's Budget is the foundation from which Congress
makes resource allocation decisions in fulfillment of it's
Constitutionally assigned responsibility to appropriate funds for the
activities of the Federal government. DON is actively involved in the
congressional review phase. Participation includes the preparation and
justification of materials in support of the President's position,
testimony at hearings, and publication of posture statements detailing an
assessment of the current state of the Navy. The Navy role is
fundamentally changed during the congressional review. During this phase,
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Navy representatives are called upon not to present Navy initiatives but
rather to consistently support the President's DOD budget. As the
authorization and appropriation legislation winds its way through
Congress, NAVCOMPT will be called upon to provide responses to changes in
Navy components to the President's budget submission.
The congressional budget review is a complex process inviting the
active involvement of many committees and subcommittees.[Ref. 56]
Because the defense budget has economic implications for every state, and
to some extent every congressional district, all but a few senators and
representatives take an active interest, if not active role in the
process.
Congressional review has three phases: Budget Resolution,
Authorization, and Appropriation. The Budget Resolution requires the
approval of both houses and establishes totals for revenues, outlays,
budget authority, and the federal deficit. This resolution is not law and
does not require Presidential action. However, existing legislation may
require changes in order to accommodate the decisions embodied in the
Budget Resolution. These changes are consolidated in a reconciliation
bill which along with the Budget Resolution fall under the purview of the
House and Senate Budget Committees.
It is through the Authorization process that Congress engages in it's
primary review of DOD program and resource allocation decisions.
Authorization bills provide the legislative authority to establish or
maintain a Government program or agency.[Ref. 57] During this
phase appropriation totals are set which ostensibly can not be exceeded.
The authorizers also detail constraints on DOD activities, set limits and
guidelines for specific programs and establish end strength limits. In
theory, programs are created or sustained through authorization prior to
the appropriation of funds. This relationship is legitimized under Title
10 USC 114 which states that "No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal
year to or for the use of any armed forces ...unless funds therefor have
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been specifically authorized by law". In fact, congressional action on
authorization and appropriation occur almost simultaneously and often
contain contradictory provisions. In 1986 for example, the total
divergence between authorization and appropriation at the line item level
was $6.5 billion.[Ref. 58] The power struggle between
authorizers and appropriators continues unabated and presents DOD managers
with the treacherous quandary of executing the mandates of one or the
other. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees and their respective
subconmmittees are responsible for this legislation. The House and Senate
prepare independent authorization bills that reflect their differing
interests and concerns. These bills annually build from the
recommendations of the appropriate subcomnmittees which conduct hearings
and perform a detailed review of applicable portions of the President's
proposed authorization. They are further debated and amended during full
committee review which is followed by presentation on the floors of each
chamber. While under consideration on the House and Senate floors any
member may propose amendments to the authorization bill. Following the
consideration of amendments votes are taken. The House and Senate bills
are then considered by a Conference Committee where a single bill is
hammered out and returned to each chamber for final approval.
Following or concurrent with authorization process, the House begins
the appropriation process. Unlike authorization, the appropriation
process generally is performed -sequentially with House action preceding
the Senate and culminating in the resolution of differences in conference.
Appropriation legislation is initiated in the House Defense Appropriations
and Military Construction Subcommittees. Hearings are conducted,
amendments are considered and at the end of deliberations the bill is
brought before the full committee. While before the full Appropriations
committee, amendments are again proposed and voted. If approved, the
appropriation bill is presented to the House floor for additional debate
and the consideration of amendments. As in the authorization process, any
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member may propose amendments, subject to parts of order related to
deficit ceilings and other rules. After all proposed amendments have been
considered, the approved bill is forwarded for Senate action. Senate
procedures functionally mirror the House action. Once the Appropriation
Bill is approved by the full Senate it is forwarded to the Conference
Connittee to resolve differences. After differences have been resolved,
the bill is reported to the Senate and the House where votes are taken.
Once approved by both chambers, the Appropriation Bill is forwarded for
Presidential Signature.
In the event that Congress fails to pass all appropriation bills that
fund DOD activities by the beginning of a fiscal year, Congress will enact
a Continuing Appropriation Resolution. The continuing resolution provides
funds required by DOD to continue operations. The continuing resolution
includes language limiting the level of spending, may specify spending
levels for certain programs, and may address any other congressional
spending concern. While designed as a short term solution to the failure
to appropriate, the continuing resolution has lasted for as long as an
entire year (ie. 1988). In FY 1990, four continuing resolutions were
required before an appropriations bill was enacted. The failure to enact
appropriating legislation in a timely manner further increases the
difficulty of DOD budget execution.
b. Budget Execution
Budget execution is the final phase of "svy budgeting. Enactment
of appropriation bills provides authority to spend money in execution of
the budget. Funds flow through the Department of the Treasury after OMB
certification. Treasury establishes specific amounts which may be
executed by Departments and agencies according to appropriation line items
detail provided by Congress. OMB apportions the appropriations to the
Federal departments. Subsequently, DOD further apportions the budget
among the military departments and services. NAVCOMPT allocates the funds
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out to the responsible claimamcies, which in turn allocate funds to sub-
organizations to the conuand and budget activity levels.
C. CONCLUSION
The data developed in this chapter provide a basis for analysis in
Chapter III. The historical, current and projected budget data were
viewed from the perspective of appropriation, program and the pillars of
defense in addressing the research questions indicated in Chapter I.
Specifically, the data base was designed to facilitate the evaluation of
the actual decrements from multiple perspectives to better understand the
impact of reductions. Further, the data base permits analysis of DON
resource allocation decision making using the Jones and Behn models of
cutback budgeting.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENSE DUDGET, PROGRAM AND PROCZSS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the following research questions using the
budget data base developed in Chapter II.
* What are the overall, sulmary trends in funding levels in the DON
budget?
* What impact did the FY 1991 reductions have on the DON?
* What changes have occurred to the DOD/DON budget process as a result
of reductions?
* How do DOD/DON budget reductions correspond to Jones and Behn'smodel
of cutback budgeting?
Analysis of the budget process according to the theories of Jones and
Behn requires descriptions of their models. This analysis is applied to
the data used to answer the other questions to give a better understanding
of the budget process, budget reductions and the impact of budget
reductions in the present and out years.
a. SUMMARY TRENDS IN DEFENSE AND RAVY FUNDING LEVZLS
The data presented in Chapter II indicate a number of trends in
DOD/DON budgeting. The following section begins with an analysis of the
trend between appropriations and the DOD/DON topline real dollar changes
indicated in Chapter II. This is followed by a discussion of the
relationship between the funding of Strategic and Conventional programs.
1. Appropriation Trends
The data detailed in Chapter II clearly show that funding for
Procurement, Operations & Maintenance, Manpower and Research, Development,
Testing and Evaluation accounts has changed significantly over time. The
following analysis addresses these trends.
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The defense budget has been shrinking since 1985 when DOD budget
authority peeked at $287 billion. Budget Authority has declined in real
dollars each year since FY 1985 and is anticipated to decline through at
least FY 1995. Through FY 1990, real annual decrements have ranged from
a low of 1.3 percent in FY 1989 to a high of 4.4 percent in FY 1986. The
cumulative real dollar decline from FY 1985 to FY 1990 was 13.6 percent.
By FY 1995, the real cumulative decline is expected to reach 22.4
percent.[Ref. 59] At $223 billion in indexed FY 1985 dollars,
the FY 1995 DOD budget will reach its lowest level, measured as a percent
of GNP or total federal spending, since World War II. During the Reagan
buildup from FY 1980 - FY 1985, the procurement accounts grew radidly as
a percentage of the DOD budget (Figure 5). Common size analysis indicates
that procurement rose from approximately 25 percent of the total base in
FY 1980 to 34 percent by FY 1933. The "bow wave" effect caused by the
rapid introduction of new programs sustained the procurement accounts
through FY 1985. By FY 1986, procurement began to fall and in FY 1991 the
decline reached 24 percent of total DOD budget putting it at a level below
that of the pre-Reagan buildup.
By contrast, the RDT&E accounts remained relatively constant at around
10 percent of the DOD budget during the Reagan buildup. Real dollar
growth for these accounts ranged from a low of -1.1 percent in FY 1980 to
a high of 14.5 percent in FY 1982. Unlike procurement, real growth in
RDT&E as a percentage of the total budget, continued through FY 1987 and
by FY 1991 had reached 14 percent of the DOD budget. The inverse
relationship between these accounts reflects choices between continuing
the production of current generation weapon systems versus the development
and deployment of the next generation of weapons incorporating new
technology. The military departments and services have demonstrated
willingness to curtail current force structure to continue development
efforts.
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DON budget projections reflect a force structure of fewer than 500 ships
by FY 1997. "In a period of budget downturn, the services protect new
weapon designs because officers consider them the seed corn of the next
generation."[Ref. 60]
The MILPERS accounts declined steadily as a percent of the DOD budget
from the end of the Vietnam conflict through FY 1985. Funding for MILPERS
Navy declined in real terms during each year of the 1970s from a high of
$23 billion in FY 1970 to a low $17 billion in FY 1979. Throughout the
1980s, funding remained almost flat, with annual real growth greatest in
FY 1987 at 6.5 percent and lowest at of -3.5 percent in FY 1986. Through
FY 1990, end strength reductions have been accomplished through normal
attrition and voluntary early-out programs. To date, the MILPERS and
services have not been compelled to make hard decisions in the reduction
of end strength. The limited reductions taken so far have not required
involuntary reduction in forces or forced retirements. Congressional
hearings have been conducted to consider alternatives to increase
attrition including separation pay for enlisted personnel, increased
separation pay for officers, and retirement alternatives for service less
than 20 years. However, the FY 1991 Defense Appropriations Bill reduced
military end strength significantly by 78,600. This is in addition to the
20,000 cut proposed by DOD for FY 1991. U. S. forces in Europe will be
reduced by 50,000 in FY 1991. In contrast, the FY 1991 Authorization Bill
legislated a 100,000 cut in end strength. These cuts will be borne by all
services with the Army taking the largest cut of 42,000. The rest of the
cuts were distributed with Air Force cutting 35,000, the Navy 20,000 and
the Marine Corps 3,000. Secretary Cheney has proposed steady end strength
reductions from the 1990 level of 2.1 million to 1.6 million by 1995.
The current deployment of 400 thousand American servicemen to the
Persian Gulf confuses projection of end strength reductions. During
congressional hearings on the impact of Desert Shield, Senator John Glenn
(D-Ohio) stated his concern about reducing active military end strength.
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"It is clear to me that the Pentagon cannot carry out the Persian Gulf
deployments and make the 100,000 reduction in active duty strength
Congress ordered by October 1, 1991." In fact, both the Army and the
Marine Corps have found it necessary to prevent active duty personnel from
leaving the service in order to support Operation Desert Shield.
O&M has shown constant growth in real dollars since FY 1975. The
account increased from $26 billion in FY 1975 to $91 billion in 1990.
From FY 1975 to FY 1980, O&M also increased as a percent of the total DOD
budget, peaking in FY 1980 at 33 percent. Even though O&M decreased as a
percent of the total DOD budget during the Reagan buildup, it increased in
real terms by $39.2 billion. During the builddown from FY 1985 to FY
1989, O&M accounts have remained relatively constant as a percent of DOD
budget. The O&MN account followed the DOD trend during this period.
During the buildup, O&MN peaked at 31.6 percent of the total DON budget
(Figure 6). Since FY 1985, O&MN has constantly declined as a percent of
the total DON budget. This constant decline has reduced the FY 1991 O&MN
account to 23.5 percent of the total DON budget. In constant dollars it
has fallen from $32 billion to $27 billion.
O&MN funding appears to be inversely related to the funding of the
Navy Procurement accounts. Since FY 1970, changes in the O&MN accounts
have been accompanied by opposing changes in the procurement accounts.
During the periods (1974-75,1979-81,1985-86) the two accounts represented
approximately the same proportion of the tota ')N budget.
Throughout the period, FY 1970-96 the trend between DON appropriation
accounts closely matched the trend in DOD funding. It appears in both
cases that the rapid build-up of procurement during the first Reagan
Administration was funded at the expense of O&M and MILPERS accounts.
Conversely, after procurement peaked in FY 1985 and began its descent, O&M
and MILPERS gained as a portion of the DOD/DON budgets. RDT&E also gained
as DOD priorities transitioned from continued procurement of existing
weapon systems to the development of next generation weapons.
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2. Conventional Versus Strategic progrs
The emphasis on increased defense funding for high technology
strategic weapons during President Reagan's tenure in office has continued
by the Bush Administration. In remarks by President Bush to the Aspen
Institute Symposium on August 2, 1990, he stated his position on strategic
deterrence and the weapons required to deter.
The Soviets will enter a START treaty with a fully modernized, highly
capable and very large strategic force. To maintain clear and
confident strategic deterrence into the next century we need the B-2.
In light of a reduced budget, DOD/DON will have to make difficult
decisions between spending on the modernization of strategic forces or
maintaining conventional forces. This section analyzes trends in the
funding of strategic and conventional forces.
From FY 1980 - FY 1985 spending on the procurement and support of
strategic forces grew 114 percent over inflation. During this time frame,
the Navy portion of the strategic procurement budget grew approximately 25
percent. "Despite a 22 percent reduction after inflation from FY 1985 -
FY 1989, funding for DOD strategic forces remained approximately 66
percent higher in constant 1989 dollars in FY 1989 than it was in
1980."[Ref. 61) The FY 1991 budget includes continued support
for the modernization of each leg of the str.ategic nuclear triad. The
President's FY 1991 budget request reflect3 continued support for the
Trident II missile, the Peacekeeper Missile, small intercontinental
missiles, B-2 bomber, and advanced cruise missiles. DOD planning
estimates still reflect an average 2.2 percent real growth in strategic
procurement funding between FY 1990 and FY 1996, peaking during FY 1993 at
$14.9 billion. The strategic program growth envisioned by DOD has not
been matched by sufficient reductions in conventional forces to keep
within the bounds of Budget Enforcement Act constraints.
Despite the Bush Administration's continued support for strategic
programs, the House Armed Services Committee boosted funds for
conventional weapon systems at the expense of strategic systems in FY
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1990. In addition, the Armed Services Conference Committee added funds for
the V-22 and F-14D largely through a 17 percent reduction in the
President's request for the B-2 bomber. The poaching of strategic
programs continued in FY 1991 congressional action. The President's TY
1991 budget request for the following strategic programs were among those
reduced by the Armed Services Conference Committee.
Table 12
STRATEGIC PROGRAM REDUCTZONS ($ millions)
Program Request Appropriation Difference
B-2A $2,495 $2,349 -$146.6
B-2A (AP-CY) $710 $0 -$710.0
B-13 $134 $69 -$64.3
3-52 $109 $58 -$50.5
NX MISSILE $1,727 $655 -$1,072.0
SDI $4,195 $2,890 -$1,305.0
TRIDENT 1I (R&D) $90 $70 -$20.0
TOMAMAWK $808 $658 -$150.0
TRIDENT SB $1,387 $1,244 -$143.0
*source: Conference Report, DOD Appropriations, October 24, 1990
In response to Operation Desert Shield the administration has proposed
conventional missions for the B-52 and the B-2 to counter eroding support
for these programs. Critics have referred to Operation Desert Shield as
a lobbyist's dream because it has diverted attention from the "peace
dividend" and has forestalled program terminations. "The defense
contractors are going to cash in," says Congresswoman Pat Schroeder, a
senior member of the House Armed Services Committee. "There are days when
I wonder if they didn't put Saddam Hussein up to this whole thing."
[Ref. 62]
As of November 1990 the Navy had not yet proposed a conventional role
for the SSBN. The Navy's D-5 strategic missile production is funded for
52 missiles in FY 1991, but falls to 48 in FY 1992 and further to 44 in FY
1993. One new Trident SSBN is funded for construction in FY 1991.
Reprogramming of $203.4 million was requested to fund the termination of
62
the Trident Missile submarine by DON after delivery of the 18th hull.
Plans to decommission one SSBN during FY 1992 have been modified,
increasing the inactivations to three followed by five more in FY 1993.
Operations and Maintenance support for Navy strategic programs projects
growth from compliance verification for arms limitations agreements and
costs associated with the increased decommissioning rates.
C. IMPACT OF BUDGET REDUCTIONS
1. Zntroduction
As of the first part of FY 1991, budget reductions have had a
pervasive impact on the activies of DOD/DON. The scramble for resources
has intensified competition both within and among the services. It has
led to changes in the way the Defense Department does business,
reinvigorated the search for management and organizational efficiency
improvements, and to some extent has changed the budget process itself.
The magnitude of the impact of budget reductions has led some to say that
"...budgeting now almost drives the mission
requirements."[Ref. 63]
2. Procurement
Arms procurement and spending has been reduced to an issue of
affordability without clear definition of changes to the force structure.
Congress and DOD are scrambling for FY 1992 to define the strategic
defense plan and program and to further determine how to meet these needs
with long range procurement from FY 1992 to 1997.
House Armed Services Chairman Les Aspin warned that Congress will
impose a "Pork Strategy" unless the Pentagon budget reflects the reduced
Soviet Threat and emerging U.S. requirements which, in his view, were not
included in the FY 1991 DOD spending proposal.[Ref. 64] Also, in
April of 1990, the House Budget Committee Chairman, Leon Panetta, delayed
setting a budget target until a six year defense plan (SYDP) was
established that reflected changes in the world situation.
(Ref. 651 In addition to redefining the threat and force
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structure, Congress, the DOD, and the individual MILPERS are all
attempting to define their long-range procurement needs. For example:
" Navy requested $1.5 million in FY 1991 to begin concept definition
studies.(Ref. 661
* Aircraft procurement plans are being assessed in the Navy's Carrier
Air Wing Study 2010 in an attempt to match requirements and
acquisition plans.[Ref. 671
" Project February was an attempt to develop Naval Aviation needs for
the next 20 years.(Ref. 68]
In mid-1990 OSD conducted Major Ships and Aircraft reviews that caused
the Navy to reassess force structure.
It is particularly important for the procurement program of DOD/DON
to have a clear definition of goals and needs. The long duration of the
production process for items like aircraft and ships, and the budgetary
practice of full funding /advance procurement mean that short-notice
changes in funding have a negative effect on the production processes and
actions. [Ref. 69] Changing rates of production affect fixed and variable
costs, incurring inefficiencies as economies of scale
disappear. [Ref. 70] Exogeneous changes to the procurement
funding plan are nearly always detrimental to efficiency. As a percent of
the total DON budget, funding has fluctuated in procurement more than in
any other area[Ref. 71] (Figure 4).
In the face of budget reductions there have been efforts by the
President and the MILPERS/services to improve the acquisition and budget
process. In July 1989, in response to President Bush's order to improve
defense management practices, Secretary of Defense Cheney, issued the
Defense Management Report (DMR) . The DMR provids a plan to implement many
of the Packard Commission's recommendations to substantially improve the
performance of defense acquisition systems and to manage more effectively
the department and its resources.[Ref. 72]
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The DMR initiatives are designed to achieve six broad goals:
* reduce costs while maintaining military strength.
* enhance weapon systems program performance.
" reinvigorate the planning and budgeting process.
* reduce micromanagement.
* strengthen the defense industrial base.
* improve observance of ethical standards in government and industry.
[Ref. 73]
As a result of these initiatives, a more streamlined acquisition
process is the goal of the MILPERS and services. A streamlined
acquisition management structure would develop clear lines of
responsibility and authority running from the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition through full-time service acquisition executives, full-
time program executives and full-time program executive officers to
individual program managers.[Ref. 74] A new Under Secretary for
RDT&E may also be created within OSD to improve efficiency and research
planning, programming and budgeting.
Using the DMR as its guide, the Department of Defense has
identified initiatives to save about $2.3 billion in fiscal 1991. Over a
five year period, FY 1991-1995, the cumulative savings have been projected
at approximately $39 billion.[Ref. 75]
"All three Military Departments are -mplementing acquisition
streamlining by tailoring implementation to their own institutional styles
and approaches."[Ref. 76] For example the Navy has integrated
acquisition streamlining into a Navy wide productivity program called
Action 88. The Action 88 program combines streamlining with value
engineering, use of nondevelopmental items (NDI), better use and content
of specifications and standards, and productivity improvement support by
recognition and training programs.[Ref. 77] All of this is
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consistent with the Navy's concurrent implementation of the Total Ouality
Management (TQM) program.
In addition to streamlining the acquisition process, in 7990 the
Pentagon proposed a Defense Management Improvement Act, aimed at improving
military spending. "The proposal would allow the Pentagon to waive
acquisition rules for up to six programs, bolster the use of commercial
goods and make it easier for small contractors to win government business.
The proposed legislation was sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and
John Warner (R-Va) at the Defense Departments request."[Ref. 78]
Table 13
DNR SAVINGS PROJZCTZD IN TRE DOD BUDGZT
(Dollars in illions)
CATEGORY FY 1991 FY 1991-1995
Logistics/Acquisition 1,450 21,000
Administration 300 3,700
Civilian Substitution 20 500
Automated Support &
Information Systems 30 4,300
Finance, Procurement &
Contract Management 200 3,900
Consolidation Studies 300 5,600
TOTAL SAVINGS 2,300 39,000
*source; Congressional Budget Offic. August 1990
The Defense Management Improvement Act has met some difficulty in
gaining approval from Congress. Some congressmen have reacted cautiously
because they are fearful that it is a dodge to exclude big projects such
as the Navy's advanced tactical fighter from normal acquisition rules.
Another complaint from Congress about the Defense Management Improvement
Act is that the language is "very obscure" except to acquisition
professionals. [Ref. 79]
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A controversial section for Congress is provision for Secretary Cheney
to waive many acquisition laws and regulations for six project test
programs. Congress argues that the proposed act does not clearly
establish which laws and regulations will be waived.[Ref. 80]
Whether streamlining or the Defense Management Improvement Act will
reform military buying is yet to be seen. However, it does indicate that
the acquisition process will be changing in response to more defense
budget reductions.
Cost overruns, program cuts, delayed production and congressional
micromanagement all occur simutaneously in an attempt to meet mission
needs in the face of projected budget shortfalls.
Such adjustments to procurement threaten to seriously alter the
future of the defense industry. Reductions have caused increased costs
due to decreased production rates and program stretch outs. Older weapons
are pressed into longer service because replacements will take longer to
reach the services. These trends threaten to erode the industrial and
technological base necessary for the development and fielding of future
weapons systems.
There is a limit to how low production rates can go before they become
uneconomical for the DOD/DON and contractors.[Ref. 81] For
example, the helicopter force is in danger if the Army's LH is
cancelled.[Ref. 82] Currently, it is predicted that the losing
contractors may not be able to stay in the helicopter production
business.(Ref. 83] Department of the Army procurement plans call
for 2,096 helicopters but Secretary Cheney is considering reductions as
low as 1,292. This would be a significant drop in yearly production.
Competing companies might see peak production as low as 108 units per
year.[Ref. 84] Contractors must show in the
Demonstration/Validation phase of procurement that they would produce
below a $7.5 million per unit ceiling regardless of changes in
quantity. (Ref. 851
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The high price of new technology has caused the acquisition process
for major weapon systems to increase in development time. Constrained by
budget reductions, Secretary of Defense Cheney has been forced to extend
the procurement of some weapon systems. As Professor J. Ronald Fox of the
Harvard Business School points out, a lengthy acquisition process:
" leads to unnecessarily high cost of development
* leads to obsolete technology at the time of deployment
" leads to conservative (ie high) threat estimates[Ref. 86]
The Air Force's ATF illustrates Fox's point. A review of the ATF by
Secretary of Defense Cheney left open the possibility of delaying the
development of the ATF by two to three years. Delay of the ATF, which is
still in the prototyping phase, has lead to a $40 million increase of cost
per aircraft, which is $5 million more than the target ceiling
price.[Ref. 87] The delay would also cut into the Air Force's
expected technology edge by two to three years, which gives the Soviets a
two to three year cushion to counter the technology.
In the case of defense systems, production rates are dictated, often
indirectly, by constraints set by the Congress, the Office of Management
& Budget (OMB), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and military
departments and services.(Ref. 88] Annual review required by
acquisition regulation has caused Congress, OMB, OSD, and military
department services to immediately curtail the procurement of some weapons
systems to stay within budget constraints.
3. Impact On Tho Industrial base
Budget reductions have caused major repercussions in the defense
industry including the decline in finacial viability the number of defense
contractors and subcontractors. The number of U.S. companies producing
defense-critical hardware declined from 118,000 in 1982 to fewer than
40,000 in 1987, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.[Ref. 891 "Experts voice concern that the
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critical secondary and third tiers of defense subcontractors, long
considered the most vulnerable to budget down swings and DOD profit
policies, have already seriously eroded."(Ref. 90] The primary reason for
the decline in the defense industry is if companies cannot make a profit
in the defense market then they will turn to more profitable areas in
which they can produce net income.
Since 1985, Pentagon procurement outlays have dropped $23.2 billion
in constant dollars, or almost 16%.[Ref. 91J This reduction has
taken a toll on the financial statements of defense companies. The stock
prices of government contractors illustrate the impact of budget
reductions on industry. "Stocks of major government contractors such as
General Dynamics declined 30 percent, Grumman fell 20 percent, and shares
of McDonnnell Douglas lost 50 percent of its value."[Ref. 92]
The debt to equity ratio, which measures the percentage of total
liabilities to total equity, among ten top defense contractors doubled
over the past seven years, from 14 to 37 percent.[Ref. 93] This
means that the ability of firms to meet interest and principal payments on
medium and long-term debt and obligations has been degraded, increasing
their threat of bankruptcy or at least diminishing their over all
financial strength. These developments, coupled with a reduced progress
payment rate by DOD have further eroded already tenuous cash flow
positions.
The inability of these firms to earn a profit due to budget reductions
has forced many to look elsewhere for funding. For instance, Martin
Marietta, General Dynamics, TRW and Lockheed have been looking to grow in
such areas as information technology, where they have already gained
expertise through their defense work. "In July, Lockheed decided to close
its two-year-old federal computer contracting office, which had won only
one $15 million job. Large contractors also plan to curtail
subcontracting, keeping more work for themselves."(Ref. 94]
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4. Problems Encountered by Technology Dase
"Our forte is technology. We have always tagged five to seven years
ahead of the Soviets and our other would be adversaries that use
Soviet supplied equipment."
General Robert D. Russ, USAF
Conumander, Tactical Air Conmmand
(National Defense July 1990)
As General Russ pointed out, the U.S. has long relied on a
technological edge in its weapons to deter threat. With the budget
induced changes in the acquisition process the technological advantage
enjoyed by the U.S. is in danger.
The reduction on the defense budget has forced the Pentagon to decide
between purchasing fewer high-tech weapons or relatively more low-tech,
low-cost weapons. The procurement of high tech weapons costs more. For
example, the Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) which is intended
to replace the F-15 and F-16 is projected to cost approximately $56.4
million per unit. This price tag has caused the Air Force concern that
the ATF would be vulnerable to cancelation which would mean a loss of the
technical edge needed against Soviets SU-27 and MIG-29.[Ref. 95]
The Air Force also has relaxed its avionics requirements for the
Advanced Tactical Fighter in an attempt to hold down costs that have
already exceeded their targets, and has reduce technical risks during the
planned ATF development program.[Ref. 96] These development
programs may have implications for the Navy's future aircraft purchases.
5. Problems Stemming From Reduced Production Rates
Other effects of budget reduction are cuts in production rates and
program stretch-outs. Because of the expected long range reduction of
U.S. defense spending plans - a $200 billion cut between now and 1994 -
the military is left with essentially two hardware options. "It can
either produce a limited number of new technology programs, such as the V-
22, A-12 and the ATF, or modernize and extend the service life of existing
aircraft."[Ref. 97] The stretch-out of weapon systems, such as
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the F-14, result from pressure on the Navy to stay within its reduced
budget and the expense associated with high-technology weapons. For
example, the Navy may stretch-out production and delay deploying new
carrier based aircraft, including up to a five year delay in fielding an
F-14 replacement.[Ref. 98)
The cost of the A-12 Avenger 2, one of the new carrier-based aircraft
the Navy is developing, has been estimated as high $92.6 million per
aircraft.(Ref. 99] This cost has caused the Navy to stretch the
life of the A-6 aircraft which the Avenger 2 was scheduled to replace.
Increased cost estimates and falling budgets already have reduced total
planned program requirements from 854 aircraft to 620. The future of the
A-12 is now further clouded by revelations that the program overrun is
approaching one billion dollars and that the aircraft does not meet
performance requirements. Congressional and DOD displeasure have resulted
in the termination of the program's senior Navy managers and increased
congressional scrutiny. The A-6 was to be replaced by the A-12 in 1994-
95. However, current estimates indicate that A-12 introduction will be
sometime around the year 2000.[Ref. 100] Although increased
cost from program delay has yet occur for the A-12 it has already begun to
stretch the life of the old A-6 airframe.
Another airframe called upon for extended service is the F-14 Tomcat.
"The Navy and Grumman are conducting fatigue tests to determine if the F-
14's maximum service life can be stretcl : from 7,500 to 9,000
hours."[Ref. 101] The reason for these tests is the stretch-out
of procurement of the NATF.
The NATF is a version of the Air Force's ATF, which the Navy and Air
Force have jointly developed. As mentioned, procurement of the ATF is
suffering from budget induced project delays which inexorably lead to a
higher cost. The problems of the ATF apply to the NATF, and the Navy is
experiencing difficulty in procuring the replacement for the F-14.
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The production of the F-14D was cancelled for Fiscal Year 1990. The
preliminary budget request for FY 1992 contains only funds to continuing
remanufacturing F-14A fighters into the D configuration.
[Ref. 102] The overall impact of budget cuts is a decline of 66 F-14s
through 1994. A study by the Comptroller General of the United States,
regarding the F-14A aircraft procurement concluded that a procurement
reduction of 66 airframes and an increase in the time during which they
would be produced has raised the estimated program cost by $2.3 billion -
about 38 percent.[Ref. 103]
D. CHANGES IN THE BUDGET PROCESS
1. The Budget Process During Retrenchment
The FY 1991 Appropriations Bill that was reported out by the House and
Senate Appropriations Conference Commuittee is a clear signal that
business as usual prevailed in the congressional annual allocation of
defense dollars. The Conference Committee report contained 145 pages
dedicated almost exclusively to changes to the President's budget request.
Congressional action resulted in a large number of line-item changes
affecting many programs. While the reduction to the President's request
was significant, the absolute value of congressionally mandated
appropriations was even larger.
For example, the DOD RDT&E accounts were reduced by only two tenths
of one percent, while the absolute value of the individual changes
equalled 16 percent of the President's request _-r RDT&E.
It is clear that Congress intends to remain inextricably involved in
the details of DOD programming and budgeting, and that Members are quite
willing to supplant DOD interests with their own. While the Conference
Report claims a $19 billion reduction from the President's defense budget
request, the actual amount appropriated includes several billion dollars
in funding for unrequested programs. Congressionally earmarked funds for
programs were spread as widely for FY 1991 as in previous years. For
example, Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, complained about the $1.6 billion in
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research funding directed towards ten major universities, stating, "The
people from the good old boy league continue to pull one another up by
their bootstraps and throw federal money at universities." Constituent
advocacy extended to such items as a children's museum to be located in
New Jersey and a Japanese-American museum for Senator Mark Hatfield's
Oregon constituents.
Even as Secretary Cheney ordered an extension of the domestic defense
facilites construction moratorium, members of Congress successfully added
funding for Reserve and Guard construction projects in their districts.
For example, congressional authorization for Army Reserve construction
exceeded the President's request by over 400 percent.[Ref. 104]
In part, detailed congressional review of the DOD budget and
subsequent congressionally mandated changes, stem from reduced DOD
credibility on the Hill. This is evidenced by a widely expressed view in
Congress that the President's budget is "dead on arrival." Critics contend
that the vision reflected in the request does not contemplate the current
strategic environment. Congressional leaders are willing to exert their
own authority to build what they view as a credible force if the Pentagon
and the Bush Administration are unprepared to present what Congress
considers a coherent rationale for the proposed budget and program mix.
The Administration's continued advocacy of large dollar strategic programs
at the expense of conventional forces is at odds with a growing block of
legislators who view that the threat environment has changed. In the case
of the B-2 bomber, for which the Air Force has proposed new conventional
roles, congressional representatives have asked whether a billion dollar
airplane is required to perform a $40 million job.[Ref. 105]
For several years Congress has slashed the Strategic Defense
Initiative to fund their own program priorities. In FY 1991, the switch
tactic extended to other strategic programs. One senior Navy planner
expressed a view in concurrence with congressional action that DOD's
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preoccupation with the strategic mission has relegated other threats such
as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to the status of "Lesser Included Cases."
While Congress has been vigorous in protection of many constituent
interests, DOD/DON resource sponsors and programming staffs have failed to
program requirements to reflect real world resource constraints. In
response to anticipated cuts, program advocates have been overly
optimistic in projecting program costs, risk and capability. In gaming
within the PPBS process, program managers and advocates may be inclined to
present their programs as being further along the development process than
might arguably be the case. While Congress may be faulted for inserting
unwanted programs into the DOD budget, DOD programmers might be accused of
promoting their projects until media and public notice is attracted.
The President's FY 1991 budget request for DOD reflected cuts that
were below the estimated rate of inflation for the year. However, the
Appropriation Conference Conmittee cut the President's request even
further. The cuts that Congress imposed on the President's request will
have a significant impact on how DOD and the services budget in the
future. The cuts will effect the military department formulation of
budget requests for years to come. These low appropriations have to be
taken into consideration when budgeting for the out years. As VADM
Richard Miller Ret., former Navy Director of Budget and Reports, points
out, "When the topline decreases as much as it has in FY 1991, it makes
it difficult to project the budget in the out years."
The difficulty in developing meaningful budget estimates in the out
years has been exacerbated thus far by DOD's unwillingness to suspend
production of a program, treating previously invested funds as sunk costs.
The tendency is to reduce the number of ships, aircraft and weapon systems
in the budget while continuing to increase buy rates in programming. This
was confirmed during interviews conducted with a NAVCOMPT offical. When
asked "What process did NAIZOMPT use in formulating the budget request for
FY 1991?", the response was, that first NAVCOMPT reviewed construction
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contracts to determine if payments were required. If no payments were
required NAVCOMPT decided whether it would be prudent to continue
production in FY 1991 and in the out years. In programs where no payments
were required, cancellations and rebalancing were used to determine if
acceptable reduction levels could be made to that program. At this stage
of retrenchment, budgeting for new programs is not possible; the objective
is to make program cuts. In the earlier stages of budget reduction it was
possible to offer up offsetting reductions in order to get new items into
the budget. The experience of the FY 1991 budget process was that it was
easier to propose the termination of a program than it was to actually
e:.ecute the termination of that program. Actual program cuts were only
possible for programs that failed to find shelter under the congressional
umbrella and only a few programs were cut significantly in FY 1991. In
the words of RADM Williams, Director of the Navy's Office of Legislative
Affairs, "The Serengeti Principle had been invoked. The slowest and
weakest animals on the plain are the first to be eaten. Those which can
be broken away from the protection of the herd are had for
breakfast."[Ref. 106]
I. THEORTICAL MODELS OF BUDGET RESTRAINT
1. Introduction
A model, developed by Professor L. R. Jones of the Naval Postgraduate
School, indicates the manner in which public organizations recognize and
attempt to manage financial crisis and prolonged financial stress. This
model may be applied to evaluate the DOD/DON budget reduction.
Initially it may be observed that the public and the economy have
become dependent on government and defense spending. Government spending
promotes public works and defense projects and provides jobs. During
times of growth, managing government is less difficult than during times
of diminishing resources. Federal government and defense managers with
little experience in cutback budgeting are facing the burden of developing
reduction policies and programs.
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As Jones points out, the retrenchment of funds exerts numerous
difficulties in managing government programs.
The retrenchment game is not particularly attractive to politicians
no longer able to reward constituents, to public managers desiring to
preserve their programs and jobs, or to citizens benefiting from the
provision of transfer payments and services by government.
[Ref. 1071
The inability to spread funds among congressional and DOD
constituents, puts the defense manager in a precarious position. Public
support generated during times of an expanding economy may be jeopardized
if the defense manager is forced to support budget reductions. By
supporting policy which the manager believes is in the best interest of
constituents he may in fact be undermining his position relative to
operational efficiency of his agency. This directly effects the policies
and programs proposed in formulation of a balanced program and budget.
2. Application of the Jones Model of rinancial Restraint Responses
The Jones model is intended to provide information to public managers,
policy analysts and others on methods for improving the management of
retrenchment.[Ref. 108] It is based upon research on the
cutback experience of a number of government agencies. The model
describes six categories of financial crisis. This framework consist of
four categories based on the work of Allen Schick. Jones supplements this
framework with two additional phases that the federal and defense agencies
are likely to encounter as the retrenchments reach into the 1990's.
The model includes the following categories of financial crisis:
a) relaxed scarcity - where revenues in constant dollars(C$) just equal
expenditures for a period of one to five years.
(b) chronic scarcity - where revenues fall short of proposed
expenditures by less than five percent for a period of one to five
years.
(c) short-term acute scarcity - where revenues fall short of proposed
expenditures by greater than five percent for one or two years.
(d) prolonged acute scarcity - where revenues fall short of proposed
expenditures by greater than five percent for more than two years.
(e) long term-austerity.
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(f) financial recovery and continued austerity.
For each of these categories, the Jones model for public organizations
catergorizes typical policy responses. These policy responses are divided
into the general categories listed below:
Phases of Recognition and Management of Financial CrisL in
Public Organizations
Timing and Phases Events (under assumption that
degree of scarcity revenues continue to be reduced through
phase 7)
6 months 1. Ignoring that a crisis exists;
moderate reduction in expenditures;
crisis termed "only temporary."
to 2. Short-term across-the-board
expenditure cuts made and attempts to
increase revenue from existing
sources instituted.
2nd year 3. Recognition that crisis may persist
for longer period (more than one
year); casting the blame fo: causes
of the crisis; ad hoc "invisible"
Relaxed and expenditures reductions (e.g., in
chronic scarcity capital plant maintenance or
depreciation funding).
1st year 4. Broader across-the board expenditure
reduction; salary and hiring freezes
imposed; intergovernmental revenue
assistance sought, new sources of
revenue sought; efficiency-oriented
program cost studies instituted;
workload cost measures improved;
"softer" nonessential services
reduced; mandated programs examined
for reduction.
to 5. Across-the-board reductions
continued, accompanied by additional
reductions in specific programs; some
employee layoffs occur; improvements
sought in revenue -recasting;
program and polic valuation
undertaken more seLously; unions and
employee organizations resist further 3rd year
cuts in salary; "hit lists" of
programs for possible termination
developed upon traditional criteria;
the rumor mill picks up steam and
employee tension increases. Employee
training and development, staff
services and non-essential public
services reduced further or
eliminated; borrowing capability
weakened or lost; some mandated
programs discontinued.
6. Across-the-board and specific
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program reductions cause more
employee layoffs and job
terminations; specific programs are
terminated with some functions
Chronic to absorbed by other units; some
short-term employees transfer to other units;
acute scarcity employee morale and productivity
drop; some skilled and highly valued
employees seek jobs outside the
organization; negotiations held over
tradeoffs between salary reductions
versus more employee layoffs and
terminations; organization heads
recognize need for better and more
comparable program information; user
fees increased or instituted.
7. Further program terminations
contemplated or implemented; leaders
recognize need for longer-term
strategic planning to integrate
program and financial strategies;
need for restoring some expenditures
recognized (physical plant
maintenance and capital investment,
employee training); program
priorities and decision criteria
established;
Prolonged consultant assistance sought; revenue
acute scarcity base and structure analysis begins;
organizational leaders use political
contacts and leverage in attempt to
gain revenues or avoid further
reductions; credit ratings weakened;
processes developed to improve
employee participation in
program/service delivery planning and
evaluation; fees, charges, and other
discretionary revenues increased;
organizational leadership may change.
3rd year 8. Development and implementation of
long-term program and financial
planning; organization missions and
objectives renegotiated; new revenues
courses expand revr -"es to balance
budget at reduced enditure level;
employee layoffs ai.. terminations
to discontinued;organization invest in
market analysis to complement
internal program evaluation; pricing
policies, service demand changes and
segmentation studied, and budgetary
strategies examined and modified.
5th year Continued austerity conditions
accepted; reorganization plans
considered; credit ratings
stabilized; greater involvement of
external participants.
Prolonged 9. Implementation of program, financial
acute and market plans; reorganization of
scarcity to functions and responsibilities
long-term undertaken; revenues and expenditures
78
austerity balanced for one or two successive
years; some service responsibilities
eliminated through contracting out,
privatization an other means; greater
citizen involvement in service
prioritization over long-term; salary
increases instituted and some new
employees hired in specialized areas;
attempts at marketing new
organization missions and objectives
undertaken. Employee productivity and
morale improved; confidence in
leadership strengthened.
Beyond 10. Revenues and expenditures balanced
5th year over multiyear period; renewed
capability for borrowing results from
improved credit rating; some old debt
refinanced; search for new solutions
to social problems; development and
testing of "utopian" technologies and
service approaches; reformulation of
intergovernmental revenue authority
Long-term negotiated and shifted; recognition
austerity that some service and revenue
and problems will persist; improvement
financial made in integration of program and
recovery comprehensive financial planning;
citizen support for organization
improves.
The model addresses three approaches the manager may choose to make
general expenditure reductions. They include across-the-board reduction,
specific program reduction and program policy merger and termination.
These three approaches are included in varying degrees within each of the
ten phases of policy responses. Typically, management will not respond to
initial resource reductions because of a failure to recognize that income
loss has occured or will persist. This is followed by minor across-the-
board reductions accomplished through attrition, hiring and construction
freezes and the like. As the retrenchment persists, deeper across-the-
board reductions are taken and these are supplemented with initial
specific program reductions. Management responds to further reductions by
continuing across-the-board cuts, taking deeper specific program
reductions, merging activities, and making actual program terminations.
The following section categorizes actual DON reductions in terms of
Jones's ten policy responses. The purpose of this categorization is to
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assess at what phase the DON budget policy reduction decisions in FY 1990-
91 intersect Jones categories of policy reductions.
Phase 2 Reductions:
-Rescissions:
Weapons Procurement, Navy, 1990/1992
Ram $88,205,000
Other Procurement, Navy, 1989/1991
TSEC/KYV-5 $ 9,400,000
Other Procurement, Navy, 1990/1992
CARTS & CADS $ 1,700,000
Spares and Repair $ 4,000,000
Procurement, Marine Corps 1989/1991
Dragon $ 7,000,000
Procurement, Marine Corps 1990/1992
M-1 Tank $62,300,000
-Increase CHAMPUS deductible.
Is an attempt by Congress to increase revenues in support of the
program.
Phase 4 Reductions
-The Senate made reductions to the Navy's request for
industrial/depot maintenance equipment for FY 91 due to
significant amounts of unobligated balances, automated data
processing (ADP) request which have not been reviewed for
compliance with DOD life cycle management principles and the
deferral of modernization projects scheduled at bases being
reviewed for closure.
-House recommended reductions for comnissary operations were based on
disapproving increased shelf stock time, disapproving expanding
operating hours, and including savings generated by the civilian
personnel freeze.
-The conferees agree to provide $1,131,953,000 for procurement
of spare parts. The conference agreement is a reduction of
$156,589,000 from the budget request and includes FA-18, CH-53, A-12
reductions commensurate with aircraft quantity reductions.
In aircraft procurement limited quantity reductions were taken
by all airframes. Across-the-board reductions were also
recorded in the spare parts account.
-The budget provides for the procurement of no passenger
vehicles for the DON instead of 671 as proposed by the House
and 646 proposed by the Senate.
Phase 4 to 5 Transition Reductions:
-Declining Navy end strength has led to a reduction of
$123,000,000 in rY 91 to Training, Medical and Other General
Personnel Activities.
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It is anticipated that required personnel reductions in FY 1991
will be consummated through attrition, retirements and hiring
freezes.
Phase 5 Reductions
-Reduction of $17,000,000 to F-14D and AV-8B programs due to
termination of ASPJ.
Interviews conducted with NAVCOMPT officials indicated that a
"hit-list" of programs for possible FY 1992 termination was being
developed. In FY 1991 DOD budget submission 11 significant
programs were proposed for termination. During Congressional
review, funds were restored for Navy programs on this list. DON
has not reached the point in the budget reduction continuum that
coalitions can be built to support the termination of well
placed programs.
-Conferees direct that Secretary of Navy decide between the
Navy's Magic Lantern project and the Marine Corps' Airborne
Mine Detection and Surveillance System.
Phase 5 to 6 Transition Reductions
-Congress ordered that facilities, activities and personnel
levels at Memphis Naval Complex be maintained at FY 1984
levels.
This is attempt by Congress to mandate an element of equity in
the distribution of budget reductions. Navy proposed this
complex for termination and Congress was protecting it from deep
cuts.
-Navy Stock Fund reduced by $10,850,000.
-slowed production of AMRAAM.
Phase 6 Reductions
-Marine Corps deactivation of ground combat elements of 8 rifle
companies, 2 artillery battalions, 1.5 tank battalions, 3 truck
companies, a recon company and 1 regimental headquarters, 2 F/A
18 squadrons and a Hawk battalion.
-termination of P-7 ASW aircraft.
-termination of 16" gun ammo.
-termination of DON's T-45 Training Simulator.
Phase 7 Reductions
-Cut in the total number of Tomahawk to be bought through FY
1994. Instead of buying 400 missiles per year from
FY 1991 through 1994, the Navy is to get 600 per year
through FY 1992. The net loss was 400 Tomahawks, and the
program total is to be 3,060 missiles.
This is an attempt by DON to implement long-term strategic
planning and integrate program and financial strategies.
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The above analysis indicates that the Navy has progressed in it's
fiscal restraint responses to a point of transistion between the fifth and
sixth phase of budget reduction recognition. The FY 1991 budget includes
continued across-the-board cuts that will force layoffs. Individual
program reductions continue and include the Tomahawk missile, B-2 bomber
and the A-12 attack aircraft. Hit lists of programs earmarked for
termination were proposed by DOD and some were included in the President's
FY 1991 budget request. Many of these programs such as the V-22 and Sea
Lance missile were restored by Congress. The inability to terminate these
programs is a clear indication that, though DOD has begun to make budget
decisions based on phase six recognition, Congress continues to make phase
five policy responses. The Jones model indicates that as the need for
retrenchment continues, the transitional reductions taken so far are
likely to be followed by cuts more consistent with phase six. For FY 1992
and beyond actual progam terminations will be increasingly employed as a
policy approach.
3. Application of the Behn Model of Cutback Budgeting
In his work on cutback budgeting, Robert D. Behn, describes budgeting
during retrenchment as fundamentally different from budgeting during times
of growth. The fundamental differences are as follows:
INCREMENTAL GROWTH PROCESS:
" decentralized process, doesn't require central control or
intervention.
" fragmented decision making allowed at lowest possible level.
" focus on the increment rather than the base.
" involves negotiation and accommodation, generally not requiring
coercion.
" appears distributive, doesn't require anyone to give anything up,
only to receive the increment.
" gives without trying to take, all benefit, none must sacrifice.
" largely invisible process, doesn't generate general interest.
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" historical, annual, repetitive and predictive.
" stable coalitions, participants benefit from the distribution of the
imcrement.




" budgeting through comprehensive packages.
" reductions must come from the base, therefore requiring a
reexamination of the entire budget.
" budgeting is chaotic and conflict-laden.
* usually involves confrontation and may require coercion.
" redistributive.
* some organizations must absorb cuts if others are to maintain the
status quo or receive increases.
" provokes generalized interest, all stakeholders have a vested
interest in the outcome of decrement distribution.
" multi-year, erratic, unpredictable and precedent breaking.
• budgeting is painful with only blame to share.
" unstable coalition requiring active leadership.
Behn indicates that these differences suggest several elements of a
budgeting strategy for use in a cutback environment.
• centralize the budget process under stron 'leadership.
* devise a comprehensive budget package and devise incentives a n d
procedures to hold together unstable coalitions in support of this
package.
• be prepared to accept and cope with chaos, mistrust and public
conflict.
" because decremental budgeting is not routine, be prepared to
intensify the analysis of the specific situation.
The Behn model has been predictive of DOD/DON budgeting under
retrenchment. The process has been fast paced, internally divisive and at
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times, somewhat confusing. Changes in budget estimates occur rapidly as
the assumptions about the economy, deficit and strategic threat evolve.
Rivalry for limited resources, within and between the individual services
compete with increased intensity to garner their share. Cutback
management has required increasingly sophisticated analysis in order to
more ably support budget requests. The rapid pace of change requires
claimants to quickly gather information from subordinate commands in order
to respond to repeated budget calls based on different outlay assumptions.
The process has become more centralized in the hands of the budgeteers and
a small number of analysts. Claimants for resources also have similarly
consolidated control over subordinate activity budgeting in order to
present a more unassailable and consistent budget request. The
incremental budget process of buiding requirements from the bottom up to
develop a total budget has been modified severely, although the motions
are still performed. In the current climate, budget restraints are
imposed from above to form the basis for budget decisions. The FY 1991
budget was only consummated after a coalition was put together under
strong congressional leadership and a budget package was prepared that
included adequate incentives to keep the coalition from pulling apart.
The PPBS structure has remained largely unchanged during retrenchment.
However, both planning and programming have become disconnected from
budgeting. It takes years for planning and programming decisions to
become refined into the detailed program refl ed in the POM. In the
current environment, congressional or DOD decisions have made significant
deletions or additions that render obsolete the entire chain of previous
PPBS decisions required to create the program. The actions taken by
Congress and DOD reflect their current assessment of DOD budget and
program needs in the light of available resources and political situation.
The disconnect between POM and budget occurs because of the different
assumptions embodied in each. The POM reflects assumptions which may be
dated, given the ratf of change in the political and economic environment,
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while the budgeting process is impacted almost immediately by externally
imposed conditions and decisions. Because the Budget process reflects the
most recent and authoritative decisions, control of the PPBS process has
consolidated in the Comptoller organizations. Planning and Programming
have become a function of the budget to a great extent as decisions are
made during the terminus of the budgeting phase and are pushed back down
* through the system.
The growing variation between the President's proposed
strategic/conventional mix and the mix enacted by Congress is a further
indication that the current vision of the congressional leadership is at
odds with the doctrine implicit in the DOD budget request. DOD doctrine
is based on planning and programming decisions that have evolved over a
number of years.
Decision centralization is further evidenced in the DMR and defense
acquisition initiatives. The DMR seeks to consolidate many DOD
administrative activitie' that are currently performed by the individual
services. These functions would now be performed as DOD activities under
direction of OSD. Acquisition initiatives have sought to place greater
control in the hands of OSD. The continued trend toward OSD acquisition
will greatly centralize decisions relative to what systems will be
procured by the MILDEPS.
7. CONLUMON
Conclusions drawn from the analysis of the data presented in
Chapters II and III are presented in Chapter IV. The data are evaluated
to provide an understanding of trends in total DOD/DON funding and trends
among the appropriation types. Information is presented that shows the
relative change in the mix of strategic and conventional programs.
Finally, conclusions are presented regarding changes in the budget process
and the usefulness of two theoretical models in evaluating Navy cutback
budgeting.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS ON BUDGZT REDUCTION IN THZ DOD/DOE
A. PURPOSE or THE THESIS
The purpose of this research is to analyze and document Navy budget and
program reductions made in FY 1990 for FY 1991 and beyond. The thesis
examined budget and program data, performed statistical analysis, and
evaluated the results. Current budget and program reductions with respect
to force structure, manpower, and all appropriation accounts were analyzed
to assess their impact on the Navy. The analysis covered changes in all
DON budget accounts and involved collection of information from the DON
Office of Budgets and Reports, the OSD Office of the Comptroller, DOD/DON
libraries, and interviews with a variety of sources. Analysis of Navy
budget proposals and program data included statistical analysis of trends
and preparation of a variety of exhibits to explain the results. To more
fully interpret the Navy budget process, the budget reduction process
compared two models of cutback budgeting developed by Jones and Behn.
This chapter discusses conclusions drawn from the analysis. Finally, this
section presents reconuendations for future research.
a. CONCLUSIONS
Through FY 1991 the budget reductions taken by DOD/DON have largely
been across-the-board/horizontal ad hoc decrements taken at the margin.
Program terminations have been almost non-existent. Acquisition programs
have been sustained through stretch-outs and reduced annual buys.
Military and civilian personnel reductions have been accomplished through
attrition, retirement, early-out programs and civilian hiring freezes. No
lay-offs or involuntary reductions in force have been required.
Operating account reductions have been taken across-the- board
corresponding to moderate decremental changes to force structure. At
present, FY 1991 budget allocations have not been distributed to the
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operating commands. However, requirements for Operation Desert Shield
already have resulted in spending that exceeds FY 1991 appropriation
levels. This contingency spending has rendered moot the allocation of the
DOD O&M appropriation made earlier in 1990. While a supplemental
appropriation to fund Desert Shield is anticipated, how it will be
received by Congress and distributed to the MILPERS is problematic. The
net result is that the top-line in O&M spending targets for full year FY4
1990 have not been established.
Research and Development funding has not been significantly reduced.
However, congressional review left an indelible mark on the RDT&E
account, allocating these resources to reflect constituent interests.
The impact of budget reduction already has had repercussions on the
defense industrial base. Dwindling DOD contracts have forced many second
and third tier subcontractors, unable to compete with large procurement
firms and to search for work outside the government. If defense industry
and its technology are neglected, the resulting erosion in domestic
defense production capability will reduce the ability of the services to
sustain military operations.
Budget reductions also have caused dramatic changes in the procurement
process. Reductions have caused the DOD hierarcy to implement management
improvements (e.g. DMR) as a means for accommodating budget reductions.
Elements of these management initiatives are reminiscent of measures
proposed since the McNamara era. The head-long rush into streamlining and
consolidation may have unforseen consequences and costs that have not been
fully assessed.
Competition for resources has caused dissension both within and among
the MILPERS and services. The turf fights between the MILDEPS and the
services has dissolved any appearence of DOD solidarity in the face of
budget cuts. Interservice "poaching", including end-runs to Congress and
media appear to have affected the ability of DOD to pursue policy in one
direction, further erroding DOD's creditability with the Congress.
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The DOD budget structure has so far remained largely unchanged in
response to retrenchment. However, decisionmaking has become more
centralized in the hands of the comptrollers as the inability or
unwillingness of planning and programming activities to keep up with rapid
fire changes has become manifest. This has led to a budget process that
is no longer needs based and pushed from the bottom up, to one that is
constraint driven and forced down through the system. PPBS has proven
itself inflexible and somewhat unresponsive to fast paced change. As a
result of the laborious and lengthy nature of the planning and programming
process, decisions made early on may not reflect real world constraints at
budgeting time. Congressional scrutiny remains intense and detailed. The
resulting authorization and appropriation legislation reflects the
congressional agenda and presents DOD with large programmatic and funding
changes. The FY 1991 congreeional budget review was more centrally
managed than during preceeding years. Congressional leaders were involved
in building a coalition of members to get the appropriation legislation
passed. In the end there was an appearance strong leadership bringing the
other members into line.
The Jones and Behn theoretical models of cutbac% budgeting are useful
evaluating DOD/DON responses to an environment of diminishing resources.
The analysis of DOD/DON budget reductions using the Jones paradigm
indicates that the budget process is transitioning from response based on
relaxed and chronic scarcity to one based on chronic to short-term acute
scarcity. Current policy responses include continued across-the-board
reductions and the beginning of specific program reductions. The
inability to terminate specific programs and the avoidance of forced
personnel reductions indicate that the transition to phase six, Acute
Scarcity, is not complete.
Both the Jones and Behn model has correctly predict the centralization
of de-facto budget making authority. The Behn model also anticipated that
cutback budget making would require a comprehensive budget package in
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order to develop a coalition of supporters adequate for the enactment of
legislation. The FY 1991 DOD appropriation was the result of a budget
summit that eventually produced a single take-it or leave-it package at
the end of October 1990 that was finaly supported by congressional
leadership and the Administration. It involved the creation of a fragile
and transitory coalition as Behn predicted.
The Jones and Behn models suggest that future budgeting will require
more conprehensive evaluation and resource/program planning. In the face
of diminishing resources, DOD/DON must seize upon an over-arching issue in
order to persevere in the budget battle according to Behn. The Jones
model also refers to the need for greater attention to the organization's
service market. The dissolution of the Soviet threat has challenged DOD
strategic and conventional warfare planning and has left the Department
without a single over-arching threat issue. Both models suggest that the
Department needs to look at limiting force structure and defining which
programs are needed to support short and long-range national security
objectives. The Behn model also suggests the need to address basic force
structure questions to find the answers to the number of ships and
aircraft to be procured in the next decade. These requirements must be
built around a consistent and politically supportable vision of DOD and
military service mission.
C. RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In the conduct of this research a number areas to be investigated
further were identified. This final section outlines a number areas
suitable for future research.
1. Cyclic DOD procurement has driven many defense
contractors out of the business of producing military
hardware. The industrial base has eroded and it is
alleged that many critical items are no longer
domestically produced. Further research, beyond the
scope of this thesis, is required to determine the
extent of this erosion and to pinpoint specific
weaknesses.
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2. The Defense Management Review has been the basis for the
implementation of initiatives to stretch financial
resources through improved management efficiency. Now
that many of these initiatives have been implemented,
additional research would be useful to measure actual
savings against planned savings and to evaluate
unanticipated ramifications and costs.
3. At this point in DOD retrenchment, very few programs
have been terminated: Research to develop a better
understanding about the nature of programs actually
terminated during this and pervious retrenchments might
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